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Abstract
Public procurement contracts (PPCs) of goods, services and works is about one tenth
of global gross domestic product. Much research has been conducted on government
spending and its aggregate effects, but evidence is scarce at the micro-level. This study
exploits sealed-bid PPC auctions of construction works, discontinuity in bidders’ win
margin and firms’ daily employment variation to provide a causal estimate of winning
a PPC on firms’ employment. Winning a PPC has a small positive impact on a firm’s
short-run employment. The study investigates mechanisms and heterogeneity that can
explain the initial small magnitudes. No compelling evidence is found in favour of po-
litical connections, an information leakage channel or PPC size as explanations for the
small magnitude. A investigation of longer period shows the impact phases out in less
than a year. The lack of a long-term impact is due to runners-up winning more PPCs
and runners-up substituting towards more market revenue in the year after closely los-
ing a PPC. Finally, the impacts are concentrated in construction firms that conduct the
majority of contracted work in-house. The final estimation shows the effect is about
four new employees per PPC with a public cost per job created at e45,200 [e34,200 -
e66,200].
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Matković for expert help with data structuring and web scrape coding, and to the research team of Marino Stanković, Ivan
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1 Introduction
The World Bank estimates that public purchase of goods, services and works (i.e. public
procurement contracts, PPC) amount to 12% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP).1
Macro-research shows that government purchase creates fiscal multipliers and thus fosters
economic activity (for a review see Ramey, 2011), and additional evidence shows it can
also spur innovation (i.e. key components of iPhone, Mazzucato, 2011) and contribute to
achieving social outcomes (i.e. via green procurement, Testa et al., 2016). However, little
micro evidence has been collected on how firms behave when faced with a public demand
shock.2 From production function logic, in the short-run, firms behave primarily by adjusting
labour inputs. We contribute to the scarce literature estimating the effects of PPC on firms’
job creation using exogeneity created by competition in auctions. To our knowledge, this
study is the first to i) investigate the validity of the auction identification strategy with
respect to the political networks and information leakage channel, ii) estimate the dose
response functions of PPC sizes, and iii) estimate the heterogeneity of PPC effects with
respect to firms’ outsourcing decisions.
From a standard three-sector circular flow model, the firms produce products demanded
by households and other firms (i.e. private demand) and by public institutions (i.e. govern-
ment, regional, local institutions and state owned enterprises, i.e. public demand). Moral
hazard issues can occur between profit maximizing firms, and politicians who might not
only represent the public interest but also their own (among others see Andreyanov et al.,
2017; Lehne et al., 2018; Bosio et al., 2020; Baltrunaite, 2020; Vuković, 2020). To alleviate
these moral hazard issues, governments around the world usually have some kind of trans-
parent and competitive procedure, like auctions, to decide which firms will win the PPC.
However, even though these procedures exist, their outcomes are rather heterogeneous. A
recent macro–level study on a sample of 187 countries found a positive association between
perceived country–level corruption and unfavourable procurement processes and outcomes
(Bosio et al., 2020). Along this line, at the micro–level, Vuković (2020) suggests PPCs as
a tool to buy votes and build a crony winning coalition, Lehne et al. (2018) show politi-
cians can adjust resource allocation in favour of their family members at a great cost to the
society, while Andreyanov et al. (2017) and Baltrunaite (2020) suggest resource allocation
1Link: https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/how-large-public-procurement [Accessed 15th
February 2021.]
2We use the words ’firms’ and ’suppliers’ interchangeably. As we will discuss later, there are several
micro-level studies on PPCs and firms (Ferraz et al., 2015; Fadic, 2019; Gugler et al., 2020) but they are
rare compared to macro-level research (for a review see Ramey, 2011).
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can work via an information leakage channel between the contracting authority and profit
maximizing firms. These political economy studies suggest that selection into PPCs is not
random, and it depends not only on which private firms best serve the public interest, but
also the self-interest of politicians.
Given a steady market revenue, receiving an additional PPC represents an increase in
public revenue and therefore firms’ total revenue. Standard short-run product function logic
suggests an increase in firms’ output leads to an increase in labour inputs (Hart, 2017).3
Theory has recently started to accumulate empirical support for a positive effect of PPC on
employment (Ferraz et al., 2015; Gugler et al., 2020).4 It is also possible the effect of PPC
on firms’ labour inputs is larger than the potential effect of similar contracts in the private
market as several authors suggest PPCs can be more profitable and less risky (Duggan et al.,
2016; Fadic, 2019).
However, co-movement of output and labour is not always observed in the data (Hamer-
mesh, 1989). Co-movement between negative output change and labour adjustment was not
found by Hamermesh (1989), while Gugler et al. (2020) does not find co-movement of posi-
tive output change and labour adjustment during recession. The main theoretical reason for
no co-movement of output and labour is found in labour hoarding (Bertola and Caballero,
1994). Specifically, on the one hand, even when a profit maximizing firm does not acquire
a PPC, it might be tempted not to immediately fire their workers due to the hiring and
training costs of future hires assuming demand will increase; on the other hand, the new
PPC might not be large enough for winners to increase employment, for example because
a winning firm has economic slack and then utilizes these unexploited labour inputs in pro-
ducing newly demanded output, or reallocates workers from recently finished projects to the
new PPC (Fadic, 2019).
This study merges eight census datasets to provide several novel findings. The first
contribution relates to the auction-based identification strategy. Identifying the impact of
PPC on firm employment is difficult because of several endogeneity issues, all stemming
from the fact that PPCs are not given at random. To solve endogeneity issues, recent micro-
3In other words, we are theoretically embedded in the firms’ short-run production theory, where capital
is fixed and labour is a variable factor. We are also embedded in the market for inputs and the theory on
firms’ short-run labour demand. A firm’s decision on hiring is based, on the one hand, on the marginal cost
of labour (MCL), and on the other, on the marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL) which is a product
of the marginal product of labour (MPL) and firms’ marginal revenue of the final product (MRA).
4There are also interesting studies quantifying the connection between receiving i) a standard PPCs or
newer ’PPCs for innovation’ with ii) firm growth and innovation, but these studies do not have a source of
exogenous variation nor discuss public costs per job created (e.g. Stojčić et al., 2020).
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level studies suggest an auction-based identification strategy (i.e. Ferraz et al., 2015; Gugler
et al., 2020). Ferraz et al. (2015) uses instrumental variables approach exploiting the share
of close auctions won, while Gugler et al. (2020) uses regression discontinuity design in close
auctions and compares the employment growth of auction winners with those of runners-
up in the weeks after the auction results. Similar to the previous two studies, this study
exploits exogenous variation in a sealed bid auction win margin, and critically, combines it
with employer-employee daily hiring and firing data to estimate the effect on jobs in the
weeks and months after winning the PPC. Unlike the previous two studies which do not
address political economy issues, the present study examines the allocation of PPC with
respect to unique political and business network data. Names and surnames of all firms’
owners, chief executive officers (CEOs) and supervisory board members are collected, but
also the register of firm donations to political parties, as well as names and surnames of about
30,000 politicians at the national, regional and local levels. Multiple first– and second–order
political connection proxies are developed to show several interesting findings, from which
the most important is that winners and runners-up in close auctions are, on average, similarly
politically connected.
The second contribution is the new findings on the causal effects of PPC on firms’ em-
ployment. This study shows a positive impact on firms’ short-run employment in the 10
weeks after being awarded a PPC. This finding is in line with the previous studies in the
short-run (during expansion, Gugler et al., 2020; Ferraz et al., 2015), but our results show
different magnitude. The initial estimate of cost per job is high at e71,400, considerably
higher than the estimates in Austria (e15,351 in Gugler et al., 2020) and Brazil ($58,807 in
Ferraz et al., 2015), but smaller than estimates with more aggregate data in the US ($125,000
in Wilson, 2012). Studies investigating the effects of public grants on firm employment find
cheaper public cost per job than those reported in this study (among others Criscuolo et al.,
2019; Dvouletỳ et al., 2021; Srhoj and Zilic, 2021). The anatomy of new hires shows the
majority of new employees are lower-educated male workers already working in the construc-
tion sector in professions such as bricklayers, workers without occupations, carpenters and
joiners. 40% of winners’ new employees have their first employment in the country after the
winner receives the PPC, but a non-negotiable share of these first hires are probably foreign
workers.
Several new explanations are given for the small magnitude. Runners-up that lose a PPC
in a close auction start working more in the private market, thus indicating a substitution
of the public for the private market. Relatedly, suggestive evidence is found against the
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Matthew effect, which departs from previous studies (see Ferraz et al., 2015). The Matthew
effect, also termed the Matthew effect of accumulated advantage, suggests that the rich get
richer and the poor get poorer, which implies that those firms that win a PPC in a close
auction get more and more PPCs. However, the study finds firms winning a PPC in a close
auction receive fewer PPCs in the next year. For these two reasons, runners-up continue
growing and catch-up to the winner in less than a year and the positive effect phases out in
longer term. In the short-run, our study shows new results on dose response functions. No
evidence is found for a positive impact of small PPCs (below e100,000), while PPCs above
e100,000 show a positive impact with the largest absolute effect of very large PPCs (above
e1,500,000). The public cost per job created increases with the PPC size, which is why dose
response functions do not explain the initial small magnitude. Finally, our study shows new
heterogeneity with respect to construction firms’ outsourcing intensity and intensity of using
external workers as labour inputs. The study shows the effects are concentrated in firms
that conduct the majority of work in-house. Firms employ about 4 new employees per PPC
on average, with the public cost per job directly created at e45,200 [e34,200 - e66,200].
The rest of the study is as follows. After the introduction, the second section provides
details on the institutional setting, including details on Croatia, the public procurement
market, the formal rules of auctions, and data. The third section explains our identification
strategy. The fourth section provides the main results, and the fifth section provides results
on mechanisms and heterogeneity. The final fifth section concludes.
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2 Institutional Setting
The institutional setting is in the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter Croatia). The Great
Recession of 2007–2009 spilled over to Croatia in 2009 which then experienced a long recession
period (2009–2014). The recession resulted in a cumulative GDP drop of 12% and doubling
of the unemployment rate (for policy responses see Srhoj et al., 2020; Srhoj and Zilic, 2021;
Srhoj et al., 2021). The expansion period started in the fourth quarter of 2014, about a
year after Croatia entered the European Union (July 2013). This study investigates PPCs
in the period 2016–2018, which is interesting for several reasons. Figure 1 shows the real
GDP quarter–to–quarter change rate in percentages, showing that after the initial full year
of recovery (2015), 2016–2018 experienced a stable 4% quarterly GDP growth. This was
followed with a sharp decrease in registered unemployment from about 15% to less than
10%, as well as a sharp increase in government consumption.
Figure 1: Macroeconomic indicators in Croatia 2013–2019
Source: Croatian National Bank, Macroeconomic Developments and Outlook No. 9 (p. 4);
Croatian Statistics Office, Construction - Orders and Completed Works (sheet 3.1.3.).
The study’s focus is on the construction sector, which represents about 4.4% of Croatia’s
GDP and 6.8% of employment (Buturac, 2019). According to the Institute of Economics
Zagreb, the value of construction works was significantly increasing in the analysed periods:
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4.1% from 2016 to 2017, and then 9.7% from 2017 to 2018 (Buturac, 2018, 2019) after a
strong decline during the recession. Figure 1 also shows a sharp increase in the volume
indices of nominal values of construction works from 2016 to 2019. These macroeconomic
indicators show that private demand for construction work increased during our analysed
period in the expansion.
Finally, Croatia is a country whose Corruption Perception Index is ranked 63rd out of
179 countries, according to the Transparency International. This 63rd position is shared
with Cuba, São Tomé and Pŕıncipe, and Belarus.5 Thus, it does not come as a surprise that
Croatia’s economic system is sometimes described as crony capitalism, where firms do not
thrive based on innovation and risk-taking, but based on political connections and corruption
(among others see Vuković, 2020). For the reason above, Croatia is an ideal laboratory for
testing the validity of an auction-based identification strategy with respect to the potential
political economy confounders in identifying the impact of PPC on employment.
2.1 Institutional Details on Public Procurement
All PPCs with estimated value above 200,000 kuna (approx. e27,000) are awarded to
suppliers based on competitive tendering via online auction administered by the Official
Gazette.6 The award process is as follows. The contracting authority publishes the tender via
the Official Gazette’s online registry of public procurement (i.e. EOJN).7 Firms (suppliers)
are informed of the tender via EOJN and decide whether to bid or not. Interested firms have
to place their bid before the pre-specified deadline, after which firms are no longer allowed
to place bids. Auction is sealed bid first offer, thus, bidders are not given information on
each other’s bid, and the PPC is awarded to the best offer. Upon the deadline, the bids are
opened and the contracting authority awards the PPC to the supplier with the best offer
(bid).
Best-offer (bid) criteria is pre-specified at the start of the auction with the supplier
selection method. During the period of 2011-2016, the public procurement market was
governed by the Public Procurement Law (NN 90/2011, 143/2013, 83/2013, 13/2014), while
from second half of 2017, it was governed by the new Public Procurement Law (NN 120/16).
The mandatory supplier selection method of the Public Procurement Law (NN 90/2011,
143/2013, 83/2013, 13/2014) was the lowest price (LP), and thus the private supplier wins if
5Link: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020 [Accessed: 2nd March 2021.]
6Table A3 (col. 5) shows such contracts represent more than 75% of all PPCs’ value. Other columns of
Table A3 provides descriptive statistics of PPCs in Croatia over the period of 2015-2018.
7Online registry of public procurement, EOJN, link: https://eojn.nn.hr/ [Accessed: 28th February 2021.]
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it submits a valid LP bid.8 The next Public Procurement Law (NN 120/16) introduced a new
mandatory supplier selection method – the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT)
which meant simple LP criteria was formally no longer used.9 The MEAT tender implies that
the contracting authority selects the supplier based on a score composed of points gathered
on the basis of the price and other quality criteria at the procurer’s discretion, such as time
of delivery, warranty or quality. The Law (NN 120/16) introduced the 90% cap on the
highest possible weight to be placed on price.10 We later discuss this change in the supplier
selection method, but provide evidence that while MEAT was introduced, the contracting
authority mostly used 90% weight for the price which made MEAT very similar to the LP
tender. Once a supplier wins a construction PPC, under the condition of fulfilling all PPC
obligations, it is at the firms’ disposal to decide how the contracted works will be carried
out (i.e. in-house, outsourcing, or a mix).
The PPC tenders are supervised by the State Commission for Supervision of Public
Procurement Procedures (DKOM).11 Auction participants with a legal interest in winning the
PPC and who believe they have suffered damage because of alleged violations of subjective
rights (e.g. favourism, inside information) have a ten-day window to initiate a dispute before
the DKOM by filing a complaint. When deciding on the disputed legal issue, the DKOM
acts within the limits of the appellate allegations while it ex officio takes into account the
procedural requirements and substantive violations listed in the Public Procurement Act.
Decisions are announced publicly on the DKOM website. No appeal is allowed against the
decision of the DKOM, but the decision can be challenged in an administrative dispute before
the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia.
2.2 Data
Datasets are collected from several institutions in the Republic of Croatia, and are described
in subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 2.2.4.
8Invalid bids are essentially bids that were turned down by the procurement authority, most frequently
because the bidder did not fulfil the minimum criteria (in specifications, capabilities, guarantees or other
aspects), overpriced the contract, faced other law binding circumstances, etc. If a bid is invalid, the procure-
ment authority notes it in the document ’Bid evaluation minutes ’.
9The new Public Procurement Law (NN 120/16) started on January 1st 2017, but it was not until July
1st 2017 that the application of MEAT became mandatory. There were several exceptions to the rule of not
applying exclusively LP, but they are not important for our analysis.
10As shown in Table A3 col. 8, in years 2015 and 2016 more than 97% of contracts were based on LP.
11Official Gazette, International Treaties, No. 14/01.
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2.2.1 Auction data
The data on PPC and data on auctions is obtained from the Official Gazette of the Republic
of Croatia (2020) and its online registry of public procurement (i.e. EOJN).12 The PPC data
encompass more than 170,000 contracts awarding about 324 billion kuna (e43 billion) with
information on contracting authority names and IDs (OIB), their municipal and county IDs,
type of PPC, description of the contract, the estimated PPC value, the contracted value
of the PPC, the common procurement vocabulary codes (CPV), the number of bidders per
PPC, the name and ID (OIB) of the firm winning the PPC, the municipal and county IDs
of the firm, and the dates of auction deadlines and auction results. Public procurement data
is enhanced with auction data13 spanning years 2016–2018, and containing information at
the public procurement bid-level: name and ID (OIB) of firms losing in auctions along with
their financial offers.14 The focus of the study is on construction-related PPCs, defined as
those in which CPV starts with numbers 45, encompassing 800 contracting authorities and
4,239 PPCs in the value of e2,984 million.
2.2.2 Employment data
Daily employment data stems from the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute (HZMO) for the
period January 2014 until July 2019 and includes about 6 million observations (employment
spells). On the one hand, HZMO tracks any individual employment process in the Republic of
Croatia, and thus, when a person is hired and signs a work contract, they become obligatorily
insured in HZMO. On the other hand, when their work contract expires or is terminated,
their insurance ceases. For both events, dates are documented. HZMO is at the firm-
employee level, and firm ID is not anonymised, we can construct variables on employee
hires and terminations, their education, age, tenure, sex, and type of current work contract
at the firm-day level. In other words, all employment movement within firms and public
institutions based in Croatia can be tracked through the HZMO database. Using the work
12Link: https://eojn.nn.hr/ [Accessed 28th February 2021]. Auction data is web scraped from the
EOJN website and provide the database to other scientists and students with the goal of igniting research
in public finance. The data can be accessed via the following website: https://sites.google.com/
view/ppc-croatia. We provide an evaluation of data quality with comparison to the Official Annual
Statistical Report on Public Procurement 2008–2018.
13A thank you goes to the research assistants for typing in the auction data, for numerous random checks
of data accuracy and communication with public institutions that did not attach auction-related data at
EOJN.
14Auction data contains information on the weights used in the MEAT decision criteria (i.e. relative
importance of price, quality, or cost) and total MEAT score of each bidder in the auction.
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contract dates, together with the auction dates (subsection 2.2.1), it is possible to track
employment growth as detailed as in the days before and after auction results.
2.2.3 Financial data
Firms’ financial data stems from the Annual Financial Statements Registry (FINA) and
encompass profit and loss statements, balance sheets and firm demographic information for
all limited liability and joint-stock firms in Croatia for the period of 2015–2019. The FINA
dataset is merged with the public procurement auctions data in construction (subsection
2.2.1) based on the year and firm ID. This way it is possible to know each auction participant’s
financial and firm demographic information (e.g. financial ratios, firm age, municipality or
county of firm headquarters) in each year 2015–2019.
Definitions of variables constructed from the public procurement auction, employment,
and firm finance data are provided in Table A1.
2.2.4 Political connections data
Previous data are enriched with several datasets capturing the political economy aspect of
public procurement.
(1) Court Register for the period of 2005-2019, provides names and surnames of owners,
chief executive officers (CEOs), and supervisory board members for each construction firm
participating in the public procurement auctions.
(2) State Electoral Commission (DIP) provides information on names and surnames
of local, regional and national politicians, their political party and place of elections (i.e.
municipal/city, or county-level) covering four local and regional elections during 2005–2017
as well as parliament members over the five elections in the period 2003–2016.15 This provides
us with 22,083 unique politician full names from which we construct 17,434 unique last name
ID’s at local (city major, deputies, city/municipality hall members), and 1,272 at regional
levels (prefect, deputies, county hall members). In addition, 496 unique politicians at the
national level (parliament members) are included. The Court Register dataset is merged
with politician name lists of DIP in several ways (for details and definitions see Table A2)
to obtain proxies, of political connections which are used for the purpose of validating the
close auctions research design.
15Data from the State Electoral Commission is web scraped: https://www.izbori.hr/arhiva-
izbora/index.html#/app/home [Accessed: 12th March 2021.].
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(3) GONG provides information on names and surnames of politicians as well as their
political party in Croatia. A total of 6,103 unique politicians is in the GONG database.
Importantly, our DIP data contain a larger number of politicians than GONG, but there are
3,378 high ranked politicians that are in GONG but not in DIP nor in parliament.16 These
politicians’ full names are matched exactly with the full names of firm owners, CEOs and
supervisory board members from the Court Register.
(4) Eurostat provides information on the geographical latitude and longitude of each
municipality in Croatia. Geographical distances from Eurostat are merged with FINA and
public procurement data, and then the standard Haversine formula is used to calculate dis-
tances between the contracting authority and the construction firm in kilometres. Distance
between the two could capture not only transportation costs, but also information sharing.17
(5) Central State Office for Development of Digital Society provides data on 3,957 dona-
tions by firms and individuals to political parties preceding the parliamentary elections of
2015 and 2016.18
(6) State Commission for the Control of Public Procurement Procedures (DKOM) pro-
vides information on 16,089 official complaints on auctions over the period of 2008–2018.
DKOM provides information on each firms’ complaint to each auction, as well as the timing
and the CPV of each official complaint, regardless of the final court ruling.19 Intuitively,
if the main results are not driven by political economy issues, they should be robust to
excluding the types of construction works and regions with the most complaints.
Definitions of political connection variables (proxies) are provided in Table A2. In addi-
tion, a graphical illustration of the local–level political connections dummy is provided (in
Figure 3).
16These include individuals such as Ministers or Secretary of State who were not on the party’s list at
local, regional or national elections, but are members of a party. With DIP and GONG the study includes a
total of 50,718 observations, but since politicians are present at multiple elections, the data includes 25,595
unique politicians.
17There are 556 municipalities in a population of 4 million in Croatia. The municipality
of the firms’ headquarters and the municipality of contracting authority are used. Eurostat:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-data/administrative-
units-statistical-units/communes#communes13 [Accessed: 20th January 2021]
18This data is web scraped from the following link: https://sredisnjikatalogrh.gov.hr/
Politicke-stranke-i-izbori [Accessed: 12th March 2021.]




The goal of the study is to identify the effect of PPC (treatment) on construction firms
employment growth (outcome). Several issues underpin the attempt to identify this causal
estimate. Selection into PPC is not random, and therefore winners of PPCs could have an
unobservable intent to work on additional projects, have proper resources, specific expertise
and capabilities to get the work done. The identification strategy applied in this study is the
so-called ’winner–runner-up’ identification strategy (applied also in the fields of industrial or-
ganization, urban economics or finance by Greenstone et al., 2010; Kawai, 2011; Malmendier
et al., 2018; Kawai et al., 2019). Such an identification strategy was applied for estimating
the effect of PPC on employment by Gugler et al. (2020).20 The assumption behind the iden-
tification strategy is that auction participants bid competitively. A theoretical framework
by Gugler et al. (2015) describes the optimal bidding strategy of an auction participant; it
assumes bidder j knows its private cost for PPC project c and provides a bid at an auction.
Bidder j knows who other competitors are, but does not know their bids. PPC is awarded
to the bidder with LP with the condition of not being below reservation price. The winner
of the PPC earns a profit equal to the difference between the bid and the PPC project cost
c, other competitors earn zero profits. Thus, optimal bidders’ strategy is a function of PPC
project cost, number of competitors and their identity such that, competitors bid the true
value of the auctioned works minus the shading factor for the estimated bid of other bidders
under the condition of the bid being higher than the PPC project costs (see also Maskin and
Riley, 2000, 2003). In an ideal bidder scenario, the winner would offer a bid higher than the
costs of undertaking the PPC, but that is just below the bid of the runner-up to maximize
its PPC project profits.
If auction participants bid competitively, there could still be selection into winning a
PPC because more productive firms can place better bids (i.e. Ferraz et al., 2015; Smith,
2017; Gugler et al., 2020). Alternatively, selection might be explained with superb informa-
tion driven by political connections and favouritism (Bosio et al., 2020; Baltrunaite, 2020),
which could then ambiguously confound the PPC effect downward if such connections can
impose high mark-ups for construction works or to low productive firms with substantial
organizational slack. Conversely, it could confound the PPC effect upward if the political
connections open up more opportunities than just the PPC, e.g. unlawful conversion of
agricultural to construction land, acquiring permits and securing favourable regulations. To
20Another similar example of the identification strategy is Ferraz et al. (2015).
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solve this, this study focuses only on the subsample of winners and runners-up in a partic-
ular auction, thereby discarding 3rd, 4th, etc. placed. In addition, the study uses only the
winners and runners-up in close auctions defined as those with a bid difference below 10%,
but it also estimates effects within close auctions defined as those below 8%, 6%, 4%, and
auctions between 0.5% and 4%.21
Each auction features a date of auction competition results, which is used to define the
pre-PPC and post-PPC period. The sample of winners and runners-up is used to construct
firms’ employment panel data in order to estimate a difference-in-differences model. The
main dependent variable is the employment growth rate, calculated firstly as:
(Employmenti,t−Employmenti,base)
Employmenti,base
, where Employmenti,base is the number of employees 84 days
before auction i results, and then Employmenti,t is employment in each day t from -84 to
+84. Thus, daily growth rate in employment is firstly calculated to obtain 338 observations
for each auction, 85 for the winner and 85 for the runner-up, but to simplify the model, the
mean employment growth for each fortnight22 is calculated in the second step. This yields
12 fortnights per firm-auction observation, where the base is the 6th fortnight preceding the
auction results, zero (0) fortnight is the first 2-weeks after the auction, and the 5th fortnight
is the mean employment growth between weeks 11 and 12 (compared to the base at 6th
fortnight prior to the auction results). The following equation is estimated:






δLATEt(Tij ∗ tij t) +X
K
j ζj + ǫij t (1)
where Yij t is the outcome variable (employment growth) for a firm i at an auction j over
the period t (i.e. from t-6 to t+5). Tij is a dummy of one if the firm i won a PPC at the
auction j, and zero if it is a runner-up. The tij t is a set of time dummies from -6 to 5, each
representing a fortnight (a 14-day block) for a firm i calculated from the date of auction j.
The XKj is a vector of control variables in the pre-PPC results period, including firm size,
and firm–fixed effects, while ǫij t is a random, normally-distributed unobserved error term
capturing factors that the model omits. The term δ is the difference-in-differences estimator,
21Win margin in the window between 0.5% and 4% is used to exclude those placing a bid just below the
runner-up (below 0.5%) in order to estimate whether results are driven by these auctions. In the study
context, this is to show weather potential information leakage drives the results. If there is information
leakage, intuitively, a bid participant with confidential information would place their bid just below the
winning bid in order to maximize its project’s profit. Thus, an estimate with such potentially ’favoured ’
firms could be biased.
22This approach is from Gugler et al. (2020) in which fortnight is defined as a period of 2 weeks (also
defined by the Cambridge Dictionary).
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the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) of winning a PPC in the full sample
of winners and runners-up, while it is the local average treatment effect (LATE) for the
subsample of close auctions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
4 Results
4.1 Public Procurement Auctions
The identification strategy focuses on competitive auctions with multiple bidders, but not all
auctions have multiple bidders. Awarding PPCs via auctions with only a single bidder makes
obtaining a valid counterfactual behaviour for the analysis notoriously difficult. In general,
submitting a bid on an auction signals a firm is interested in undertaking the additional
work and is therefore growth oriented.
A reflection on PPCs awarded via single bidder auctions is provided in this subsec-
tion. Single bidding is considered as a practice which should be avoided by the European
Commission (Fazekas, 2019), and some (notably Vuković, 2020) have suggested single bid-
ding auctions could represent the purchase of votes, insider information, corruption and
favourism.23 However, single bidding practice was not uncommon in the Republic of Croatia
over the period of 2016–2018 when about 23.2%24 of PPCs in construction were awarded
based on single bidding auctions, while 76.8% are awarded based on auctions with two and
more bidders. In value terms, total single bidder auctions were contracted at e938 million,
and multiple bid auctions at e2,792 million (descriptives in Tables A4, A5 and A6). This
study uses all auctions to show two descriptive analyses:
(1) The relative cost savings from auction competition;
(2) The value of single bidder auctions marked with political connection variables.
Firstly, the benefits of auction competition for the contracting authority are shown.
In particular, Figure 2 left panel depicts the ratio between the contracted price and the
23Although considered bad practice, there can be a mix of justifiable reasons for having single bidding
auctions. In particular, procured works could be highly specialised and need specialised knowledge and
equipment that only some firms are able to provide, while at the same time there could be low supply and
low interest for procured works, for reasons such as firms already working at their full working capacity, long
geographical distance between firm and the construction site, excessively low estimated value of works, or
other reasons.
24See Public Procurement Single Market Scoreboard, link: https://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/scoreboard/performance_per_policy_area/public_procurement/index_en.htm
[Accessed 12th March 2021.]. This considers auctions with one bid after the exclusion of invalid bids, in the
entire dataset we observe 15.33% of true single bid auctions, ones with no exclusions.
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estimated PPC value across the number of bidders that applied for the construction works.
Table A9 provides descriptive regression results, suggesting that in single bidder auctions,
the contracting authority pays for the contract, on average, 5.3% less than it estimates, while
in cases in which there are eight bidders and more, the contracting authority pay on average
31.4% less than it estimates.25 Figure 2 right panel focuses only on auctions with multiple
bidders. Money left on the table (MLOTT, as in Gugler et al., 2020) is calculated, defined as
the difference between the value of the runners-up bid (e.g. second-best option) and the value
of the winning bid divided by the winning bid. Similar to the left panel, it shows that the
average difference between the two best bids becomes smaller and smaller with the increase
in the number of bids, providing suggestive evidence confirming the theoretical model of
Gugler et al. (2015), which suggests the bid is a function of the number of competitors,
inter alia (Subsection 3). Thus, competition in auctions matters for the relative cost of
construction works.
25Other factors might explain this ratio difference in auctions between single vs multiple bidders, including
local economic conditions, high level of specialized knowledge, systematic errors in public authority estima-
tion of the PPC value (denominator), or uniqueness of procured works. However, the descriptive regressions
do not provide support for this reasoning. Regressing the ratio between the winning bid and beginning esti-
mate on the number of bidders, four digit CPV code, county of the procurer, year of auction, and whether
the auction was during the season show similar cost savings as those in Figure 2 and Table A9 and are
available upon request.
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Figure 2: The relative costs of procured work by number of bidders
Notes: the left graph displays the winning bid as % of the the auctions estimated value. The data includes auctions awarded
via both LP and MEAT criteria. Points represent the means, and the error-bars show the lower and upper bounds of the
confidence intervals (both on 95%). The right graph shows MLOTT as % of the auctions winning bid. Note that we look at
only valid bids, meaning we do not observe excluded bids. Both graphs exclude the top and bottom 1% of observations, so as
to account for outliers.
Secondly, single and multiple bidder auctions are used to show how much PPC value goes
to politically connected firms marked by the political connection variables (Subsection 2.2.4
and Table A2). The study differentiates between single bidder and multiple bidder auctions,
and marks winning firms based on:
(1) Owners, CEOs or supervisory board members who are politically connected individ-
uals.26
(2) Donations to the political parties in power, and
(3) Single bid contract which is more than 70% of the prior year’s total revenue or if the
firm has no employees.
The first marker identifies direct or indirect family ties of politicians with the firm owners.
The general logic of how this marker is constructed at the local level is shown in Figure 3
while definitions are given in Table A2. The second marker provides a revealed preference
perspective of firms’ strategic networking choice or political stance. The third and final
marker is described as suspicious procurement in the literature (as developed by Vuković,
26In the Table A1 we elaborate, we mark the politically connected individuals.
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2020).27
From the e490 million in single bid auctions in construction, our study shows 82.9% of
PPC value goes to either donators, politically connected firms or suspicious firms (Table
A4).28 The same exercise is conducted on the sample of e2,792 million awarded in multiple
bid construction auctions and shows 47% of value goes to either donators, politically con-
nected firms or suspicious firms (Table A6). In multiple bid auctions, 37.4% (vs 61.1% in
single bid) is marked to go to politically connected firms, 13.9% (vs 14.6% in single bid) goes
to firms donating to political parties, and 8.4% (vs 35.6% in single bid) goes to suspicious
firms.
In sum, the study shows competition does both lead to lower relative costs of construction
works and to a reduction in the construction works share of value allocated to politically
connected firms.
27It should be clearly stated that none of these indicators is evidence of corruption, but an indicator of
suspicious practice. Is should be noted that politically connected firms might be overstated in some cases, for
example, in some municipalities or cities, there could be a mayor or council member with the same surname as
owners, CEOs or supervisory board members in a local construction firm, but they actually do not have family
connections. To solve this, a correction for the 10 most frequent surnames in each municipality and region
is conducted (as per Croatian Statistics Office: https://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/census2011/
results/htm/h01_01_31/H01_01_31.html [Accessed: 17th August 2021.]).
2868% of value is marked to go to politically connected firms, 14.6% to firms donating to political parties,
and 35.9% to suspicious winners (Table A4). The sum of these percentages goes above 100% because the
firm could at the same time be a donator, a politically connected firm and a suspicious firm.
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Figure 3: Political connections: an overview
Notes: the right graph displays the network of politically connected firms (node) and individuals (edge) in the 2018 construction firms in public procurement data.
The left graphic shows how single node relations are formed to develop the full network. The red part of the network represents political connected firms with local
connections based on the last name and municipality/city matching (see Table A2). The inner circle shows firms which have common members.
Disclaimer: all names given in the descriptive graphic are entirely fictional.
4.2 Winners versus Runners-up: Balancing Property
In the previous section, it was shown that the competitive auctions matter for the relative
costs and decreasing political influence. This section questions whether auction results can be
considered a source of exogenous variation. Differences in the bids of auction participants can
be an indicator of differences in firms’ production possibilities, a result of political influence
or collusive behaviour. To shed light on this question, this section provides a balancing
property, comparing winners, runners-up and other auction participants on a long set of
covariates.
Table A11 compares the means of all winners to all auction losers (9th column), to auc-
tion participants with 3rd, 4th and 5th bid (7th column) and to runners-up (5th column).
Several insights occur. Compared to all auction losers (9th column), winners are more fre-
quently connected to a regional political party in power (p<0.001) and to national politicians
(p<0.01). Winners are geographically closer to the contracting authority (p<0.01), have re-
ceived more PPCs in the three years prior (p<0.05), and are more frequently a state owned
enterprise (SOE; 6% vs 4%, p< 0.001). Relatedly, winners are slightly less productive (p<
0.05), have better financial indicators (EBITDA or profits over assets, p< 0.01), outsource
less work, use less external labour (both at p< 0.001), and have more workers employed on
a permanent work contract (p< 0.001). Differences decrease when the focus shifts only to
winners and runners-up (5th column), but winners are still geographically significantly closer
to the public authority (p< 0.001) and are more frequently a SOE (6% vs 5%, p< 0.05).
Table A12 focuses on the subsample of close auctions (win margin within 10%) and
compares the means of all winners to all auction losers (9th column), to auction participants
with 3rd, 4th and 5th bid (7th column) and to runners-up (5th column). An improvement
in balancing property is shown when the focus shifts only to winners and runners-up (5th
column vs 7th and 9th column). In particular, Table A12 shows no statistically significant
difference in any of the analysed covariates between the group of winners and runners-up
(5th column).
Achieving balancing property does not mean winners are not politically connected, but
are, on average, similarly politically connected as runners-up. About 24% of winning firms
are connected to regional/county politicians in power (compared to 22% of runners-up), and
26% to local politicians in power (compared to 25% of runners-up). Winners and runners-up
groups are, on average, donators to the political party in similar share (16% vs 15%) and are
similarly connected to national politicians (19% vs 16%). Winners and runners-up groups
are also, on average, similar in size (124 vs. 128 employees), have, on average, about 20
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employees with tertiary education, where the average employee tenure is 3.5 years, and the
average persons age at the day of employment is 35 years. Both groups have a debt ratio of
about 55% and about 31% of total expenses goes to outsourcing, while external workers are
about 33% of total labour costs (for details see Table A12, 3rd, 4th and 5th column).
4.3 The Impact of PPC on Firms’ Employment
Upon evaluating the balancing property, a visual inspection of the employment growth trends
of winners and runners-up is shown in Figure 4. Winning firms increase their employment
after receiving a PPC. Table A32 provides descriptive characteristics of the winners’ 11,285
new (unique) employees in the fifth fortnight. A lion share of new employees are lower
educated (89%). The five most common professions among new employees are masons (9%),
carpenters and joiners (7%), workers without occupations (7%), civil engineering workers
(6%) and operators of construction and similar machines (6%) (Table A34). Of the 11,285
new employees, 46% worked for the winner firm as their last employment episode, 14% worked
for a different firm in their last employment episode, while a substantial 40% are registered to
HZMO for the first time. From the 14% of employees that worked for another firm, Table A33
shows the majority come from the construction sector (73%), manufacturing (9%), wholesale
and retail trade (7%), and all other sectors (11%). The 40% registered at HZMO for the first
time can happen for two reasons: i) domestic individuals’ first employment, or ii) foreign
individuals’ first employment in Croatia, which does not mean they had not worked before
in their country of origin. The dataset does not enable us to identify foreign nationals, but
since this group of employees with first registered employment has 34.4 years on average,
there is probably a substantial share of employees who are not first time domestic hires,
but more probably foreign nationals employed for construction projects. Runners-up also
experience employment growth, but at a lower rate compared to winners. The general upward
moving trend in employment among the two groups is probably due to the expansion period
characterized by a significant decrease in unemployed, and a sharp increase in construction
demand and government consumption (see also Figure 1).
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Figure 4: Mean employment growth rate before and after receiving a PPC (within 10% close
auctions)
Notes: the day-by-day data on firms’ number of employees is shown relative to the average number of employees during the 6th
fortnights prior to the auction results. That gives us the employment growth rate for each firm. We then aggregate (average)
the day-by-day growth rate to fortnights (14 day periods). Confidence intervals are given at 10%.
The visual trends in Figure 4 are quantified with equation (1) and show a positive impact
of PPC on firms’ employment (Table A13). The full sample of winners and runners-up
shows a positive effect of 1.8 employees [+/- 0.6] at the fifth fortnight (70-84 days post
PPC; Table A13, 1st column), while the main regression estimates (Table A13, 2nd column)
show a somewhat higher positive effect of 2.5 employees [+/- 0.6] at the fifth fortnight. The
difference between the full sample and close auctions could be in lower transportation costs
and potentially better information, as well as more state owned firms benefiting from the
contracts (i.e. Table A11). Winning firms in the full sample might have more organizational
slack and therefore less need to hire new employees, while runners-up might be growing
more from the private market upon losing the contract. Importantly, the results for the
close auction sample are very similar regardless of whether close auctions are defined by the
win margin within 8%, 6%, 4% or 0.5% to 4% (3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th column, Table A13).29
29There is a total of 2,859 auctions (10,232 bids). The close auction 10% win margin has 1,436 auctions
(5,591 bids), 8% win margin has 1,250 auctions (4,897 bids), 6% win margin has 994 auctions (3,927 bids),
4% win margin has 737 auctions (2,932 bids), and 0.5% to 4% win margin has 610 auctions (2,470 bids).
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The effect starts to be weakly significant already in the first 14 days after the auction
results (fortnight 0), and becomes strongly significant from the first fortnight onwards, while
the point estimate is highest and highly significant (p<0.01) in the fifth fortnight (70-84
days) after the winning notice in all models (columns 1 to 6, Table A13).
In the subsection Mechanisms and Heterogeneity 5., the magnitude of estimates and
public cost per job directly created is discussed. The next section analyses the robustness of
the main model.
4.4 Robustness
The main model is based on several assumptions regarding competitive auctions, supplier se-
lection method and the intention of runners-up to work on more projects. In this subsection,
several robustness analyses are conducted to test the stability of the main model estimates.
4.4.1 Auction complaints
If auction participants suspect there might be favourism in connection with the technical
documentation of procured work, they can submit a complaint to DKOM. Table A15 shows
frequent complaints by the procurements’ first 4-digit CPV code and the top 10 contract-
ing authorities that received the most complaints. With regard to the complaints by the
procurements’ CPV, the code starting with 4523 (which represents procurements related to
the construction of highways and roads) received 32% of all construction complaints.30 For
robustness check, two regressions are run. Firstly, regression without auctions of works for
4-digit CPVs with the most frequent complaints show a statistically significant and positive
impact of the PPC on firms’ employment with a somewhat higher magnitude of 4 employees
[+/- 1.1]. Secondly, regression without firms located in City of Zagreb shows the result re-
mains significant and in similar magnitude to the main model estimate (Table A14, column
2 and 3).
4.4.2 Donations to political parties
Donations to political parties have been identified as important in acquiring PPCs (Bal-
trunaite, 2020). This study examines donations to political parties preceding the parlia-
mentary elections in 2015 and 2016. These donators to the political parties placed 1,507 of
30The highest number of complaints are registered for the City of Zagreb (4%), Hrvatske ceste d.o.o. (3%)
and other SOE with headquarters in Zagreb (see Figure A2 and Table A15).
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10,232 bids (Descriptives in Table A16). A model without firms donating to the political
parties is run, and importantly, shows that the main model estimates do not change (Table
A14, column 6).
4.4.3 Politically connected firms
With the political connection proxy (for more details see Table A2) 373 politically connected
firms are marked that place 1,346 winning bids in auctions. A model excluding all the polit-
ically connected firms is run and shows the main model estimates remain robust (Table A14,
column 4). A potential limitation of the local and regional–level political connection proxies
is its reliance on matching politicians to firms with owners, CEOs and/or supervisory board
members holding the same surname within the geographical (municipal/regional) location.
To check the robustness of this proxy, all the politically connected firms that have owners,
CEOs or supervisory board members whose surnames are on the list of most frequent sur-
names in the respective municipality or region are recoded as not politically connected.31 All
the recoded politically connected firms are excluded and regression is run to show similar
effects as in the main model (Table A14, column 5).
4.4.4 Lowest price and Most economically advantageous tender
The analysis encompasses years 2016-2018. From 1st January 2016 to 1st July 2017 the
auctions were governed by the Public Procurement Law (NN 90/2011), while from 1st July
2017 onwards it has been governed by the new Public Procurement Law (NN 120/16). The
new law (NN 120/16) introduced mandatory usage of the Most economically advantageous
tender (MEAT), which in essence required the selection of suppliers to be not only based
on the LP criteria, but in addition, the criteria related to suppliers’ quality. To do so, the
law capped the maximum share of points a supplier could possibly achieve based on price to
90%.
The descriptive analysis reported in Table A19 shows about 61% of auctions are awarded
based on the LP and 39% based on the MEAT criteria. Auctions governed by the law (NN
90/2011) and those governed by the new law (NN 120/16) have a similar mean PPC size
(e610,000 vs 570,000). After the new law, contracting authorities did combine price criteria
with quality criteria, usually operationalized as quality, costs, and/or time of finalizing the
construction work. However, two findings emerge. Firstly, time to complete construction is
31Based on Croatian Statistics Office: https://www.dzs.hr/hrv/censuses/census2011/
results/htm/h01_01_31/H01_01_31.html [Accessed: 17th August 2021.]).
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the most commonly used quality criteria.32 Secondly, while the law introduced a mandatory
shift to MEAT, 61% of auctions under the new law use the maximum 90% weight on price
criteria, 28% of auctions use price criteria weight between 80-89%, 7% of auctions use price
criteria weight between 70-79%, and only 4% with price criteria weight below 70%. Results
shown in Table A20 show a positive impact of PPC on firms’ employment regardless of
whether LP or MEAT criteria is used.
4.4.5 Contamination of evaluation period and seasonality
Contamination of the evaluation period can be important, as winning firms might win multi-
ple PPCs over the evaluation period, and could win more PPCs than the runners-up during
the evaluation period (or vice versa). A regression controlling for the number of contracts
won by the winner and by the runner-up during the evaluation periods is run, and the results
do not change (Table A23). In addition, a model is run on the subsample of close auctions
where the winner recieves only a single PPC during the evaluation period and runner-ups
recieve no PPC. Table A23 shows that the results do not change.
Finally, the impact of PPC on firms’ employment might be driven by seasonality: on the
one hand, employment could increase systematically more in those months when the weather
is warmer and less rainy, while on the other, employment could decline or stagnate in winter
months when construction works are less intensive (Gugler et al., 2020). Seasonality could
lead to correlations of seasonal employment change with treatment status. The sample is
split to construct in-season and off-season subsamples; the first encompasses April - October,
while the second includes November - March. Results in Table A23 (columns 2 and 3) show
the effects are of similar magnitude in two different seasons. In addition, a regression with
added dummy for the month of the auction results shows results similar to the main model
estimates (Table A23).
5 Mechanisms and Heterogeneity
The main model (Section 4.3) estimates a positive impact of PPC on firms’ employment in the
magnitude of 2.5 employees [+/- 0.6]. On a sample of small firms in retail and manufacturing
in Brazil, Ferraz et al. find the effect of 0.63 employees (about 2.2% employment growth,
Ferraz et al., 2015), while on a sample of larger construction firms in Austria, Gugler et al.
(2020) show growth of about 3% of the winners’ workforce or about 80 employees. To better
32Which is a relatively easier indicator to obtain points for the majority of construction firms.
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understand the magnitude, median PPC size is divided by the absolute effect size to obtain
the initial public cost per job directly created at e71,400, which is considerably higher than
the point estimates in similar studies in Austria (e15,351 in Gugler et al., 2020) and Brazil
($58,807 in Ferraz et al., 2015), but smaller than PPC estimates with more aggregate data
in the US ($125,000 in Wilson, 2012). In a related field on the impact evaluations of public
grants for firms, a recent review in the European Union shows public cost per job directly
created to range from e189,000, e62,000, e26,000, e14,700 to e6000 (Dvouletỳ et al., 2021,
p.256). In Croatia, for self-employment grants, Srhoj and Zilic (2021) estimate e38,800
public cost per job, and for small and medium-sized enterprise grants, Srhoj et al. (2020)
estimate e14,525 public cost per job. Therefore, in this subsection, analyses are focused on
the mechanisms and heterogeneity that can explain the initial high estimate of cost per job
(e71,400).
5.1 Information leakage channel
Figure 4 shows some anticipation of winners, which is statistically insignificant, but worth
investigating. Previous research (i.e. Andreyanov et al., 2017; Baltrunaite, 2020) suggests
an information leakage channel by which contracting authorities provide confidential infor-
mation to favourized firms winning the PPCs. If this was so, there could be selection of
less productive politically connected firms into PPCs, and they could potentially be charg-
ing a higher price for construction work - leading to higher cost per job directly created.33
Although it is challenging to confidently test information leakage theory, two exercises are
conducted to shed some light on whether there is information leakage. Firstly, two experts
were interviewed, one a prominent university law professor - an expert on PPC, and one
information technology expert on PPC auctions. Both agree that information leakage in
auction system is technically impossible without the consent of both sides, the contracting
authority and the bidder. This is so because each bid is encrypted via the online auction
system and two keys (contracting authority key and bidder key).34 Thus, the only way to
obtain information on a competitor’s bid is to enter two keys in the system.35
33This is quite difficult to document in construction, since every project is, in a sense, unique (because
there are no repeating locations).
34These safety protocols are certified by multiple certifying authorities, among which also European Union
institutions.
35In other words, the bidder would have to want to provide such information to other auction participants.
Another option could be that it is not the information leakage, but bid rigging, where runners-up place
artificial bids slightly more expensive than the winner. Two interviewed experts were asked whether they
are aware of such collusive behaviour, and both suggest this would be highly unusual bidding behaviour, as
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However, since interviews can be biased, further analysis on the information leakage issue
is done by collecting data on the timing of each bid. The difference in timing of the bids
between winners and runners-up is visually shown (Figure A3 and A4), while Table A25
shows tests for difference in timing of the bids. A dummy of 1 is coded if the winner places
the bid after the runner-up, and vice versa. Results indicate there is no systematic sorting of
winners into placing bids after runners-up, which is the same regardless of the characteristics
of the auction (i.e. larger contracts) or subgroup of firms (i.e. politically connected firms).
The finding of no sorting is different from the analysis in Russia (i.e. Andreyanov et al.,
2017). However, during their analysed period in Russia there was no encryption of bids in
the auction system. In sum, no compelling evidence is found to explain the high cost per
job with the information leakage channel (Table A12).
5.2 Dose response functions
The dose response functions are estimated within the close auction sample. To do so, the
sample is split based on PPC size into four dosages (bins). Splits are driven by the sample
size and types of usual work in each bin. The first dose is defined as PPCs up to e100,000
including works such as facade and stucco works, installation of carpentry, installation of floor
and wall coverings, house painting and glazing works, and remediation works. The second
dose includes PPCs from e100,000 to e500,000, such as reconstruction-based concrete and
asphalt works. The third dose includes PPCs from e500,000 to e1,500,000 with works such
as low rise construction and building adaptations. The final fourth dose consists of contracts
above e1,500,000 with works such as bridge, school, and pipeline construction. The equation
(1) is run on the four subsamples, taking the winner and runner-up from each auction within
a particular dose. Focusing on the fifth fortnight of Table A29, the results show no evidence
of a positive impact of the first PPC dose (below e100,000) on firms’ employment. This could
be because firms can conduct the procured activities of smaller PPC with existing capacities.
On the other hand, the second and third doses had a statistically significant positive impact
on firms’ employment in magnitude of 2.4 [+/- 0.6] and 2.8 [+/- 1.2] employees. Finally,
the fourth dose (above e1,500,000) has the statistically significant positive and the highest
impact on employment (7.3 [+/- 2.8]) at the fifth fortnight.
The lack of evidence collected for the impact of the smallest dose can partly explain the
high costs per job created (and the small magnitude of the effect). However, while the largest
collusion is probably more frequently conducted by not participating in the auction, which is a less costly
approach given that participation requires labour hours worked.
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PPC dose shows the largest absolute impact on firms’ employment, the cost per job is higher
than the main estimates (at e270,479; Table A35) which is larger than the estimates in the
US ($120,000 Wilson, 2012). Therefore, the small magnitude is not explained by the PPC
size.
5.3 Longer term effects
While the effects on employment are small, they could be persistent over time, for example,
because winners take fewer workers but over a longer time period to complete the work. A
similar regression to equation (1) is estimated:
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where the main difference is the length of the panel, which goes to fortnight 20 in equation
(2). The results in Table A26 show the PPC impact on firms’ employment is persistent a
considerable time after the last period of the short-run estimation in equation (1), but starts
to fade out from the 17th fortnight onwards (starting days 238–252). Thus, no evidence is
found for the longer persistence of the effects.
5.3.1 Matthew effect
The Matthew effect of accumulated advantage (short: Matthew effect) suggests that the rich
get richer and poor get poorer. In the study setting, this could be interpreted as those firms
that closely win a PPC get more and more PPCs (see Ferraz et al., 2015). The Matthew
effect is tested with two models. In both models, the sample of close winners and runners-up
is used, and at each auction time t, the number of PPCs received and their value is calculated
for each winner or runner-up in 30, 90, 180, 270 and 360 days after the auction j at time t.
Tables A21 and A22 show, contrary to the hypothesized, that the winners receive a lower
number of PPCs and a lower value of PPCs in the next year. This can be interpreted with
two competing arguments. On the positive side, firms are working at their full capacity
and are not interested in acquiring new PPCs; alternatively (on the negative side), future
research could look into potential circles of bid rigging, whereby a firm wins a PPC and




As shown in subsection 5.3.1, if a runner-up loses an auction, it can offset a loss by winning
the next auctions (Table A21). Therefore, during a longer period, for example, a year, the
winner and runner-up could obtain a similar auction value regardless of the close auctions.
Two points emerge.
Firstly, while this is a lesser issue in this study context because the dependent variable is
measured at daily level, closely winning or losing a PPC should be an important event for the
firm that is not easily offset if it is to provoke a positive firm employment reaction. To shed
light on this topic, the total value of PPCs won for each firm-year is calculated. Panel a)
of Figure A5 shows a jump in total yearly public amount won among the winners compared
to the runners-up. Table A27 shows a statistically significant positive difference between
winners and runners-up in the PPC value won.36 Secondly, even if there is a difference
in the value of PPCs received between winners and runners-up, these differences might be
substituted by working more for the private market. The value of PPCs from the firms’ total
revenue is substracted to obtain an estimate of firms’ market revenue. The change in market
revenue is less obvious. A model is run (in Table A27) to analyse the difference in means
of public and of market revenue between the winners and runners-up. Table A27 shows a
statistically significant negative difference in the market revenue. The jump in public revenue
is larger than the change in market revenue (Panel a vs b, Figure A5).
The above suggests runners-up substitute public revenue for market revenue when they
lose a PPC in a close auction. This increase in market revenue of runners-up, however, is
not enough to catch up to the winners new PPC value in the current year. In other words,
runners-up lose larger PPCs in close auctions, which they partly offset by working more on
the market and by winning more PPCs of smaller size.37
5.4 Outsourcing practice
Winning firms can fulfil the contractual work obligations in-house, but can also decide to
outsource parts of the PPC outside the firm. These activities are usually conducted as a
cost–cutting measure or because specialized outside expertise is needed for the project. If
firms do outsource, they usually conduct part of the contractual activities in-house and part
36Natural logs of PPC value to decrease the influence of very large PPCs is used.
37After losing the PPC in a close auction and winning the next PPCs, runners-up still received on average
e330,000 fewer public funds. A detailed calculation of the difference in PPC value between the PPC lost by
the runner-up and the future PPCs is available to readers upon request.
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is outsourced (Arvanitis and Loukis, 2013). The two most usual forms of outsourcing are:
firms outsource parts of the PPC to other firms, and firms ’borrow’ workers from a firm (i.e.
agency workers) specialized for construction work.38
Heterogeneous effects with respect to the firms’ intensity of using agency workers and
intensity of outsourcing construction works to its (sub)suppliers is estimated. Detailed finan-
cial statements of all firms in the sample are used to construct i) the ratios of outsourcing
costs in firms’ total costs, and ii) the ratios of external labour costs in total labour costs.
We then split the sample by the median ratios of firms in close auctions. The sample of
firms in close auctions is split by the median ratio of outsourcing costs in total firm costs,
and by the median ratio of agency workers’ costs in total labour costs. The equation (1) is
then estimated. Results in Table A30 show effects are concentrated in those firms that have
a less intensive practice of outsourcing (either i or ii).
External labour is not registered in the database, and thus the unbiased impact of PPC
on firms’ employment should be in the subsample of firms with low usage of agency workers
and low outsourcing. The study delves deeper into the ratio of external labour in total
labour costs, and five subsamples are split into five bins. Results (Table A31) confirm the
effects are concentrated in those firms with low usage of external labour, but also show that
the effect is of higher magnitude when the majority of all works is conducted in-house (4.1
[+/- 1.3] employees).39 This magnitude is taken as the more accurate estimate of the PPC
impact on firms’ employment. With the new magnitude and the median PPC amount size,40
the public cost per directly created job is quantified at e45,200 [e34,200 - e66,200].
The magnitude of 4.1 [+/- 1.3] employees is closely related to the estimate in the sample of
PPCs without frequent auction complaints (i.e. Table A14). Importantly, while no evidence
is found of a positive impact of PPC on the employment of those construction firms with a
high share of outsourcing or high usage of agency workers, it does not directly imply there
is no effect among these firms, but more probably, that the effect has spilled over to the
winners’ suppliers and to the higher usage of unregistered agency workers.
38Thus, employees are not registered within the winning firm, but are ’borrowed’ from a specialized firm
for such agency workers.
39The point estimate ranges from 3.9 to 4.1.
40e186,612 at the median, see Table A35.
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6 Conclusions
Macroeconomics has gone a long way in estimating the effects of government spending on
GDP growth. However, macroeconomics is based on microeconomics, and micro–level effects
of government spending are still under-researched. These micro gaps primarily include the ef-
fects of government spending on households and firms. The present study tackled the micro–
level effects of government spending on the employment of firms supplying the government
with construction works. An examination of PPCs and firms should take into account moral
hazard issues that occur between self-interested politicians and profit-maximizing firms. To
estimate the effects of PPC on firm employment, this study exploits sealed bid auctions in
PPCs of construction works, daily employment variation and discontinuity in bidders’ win
margin.
Winning a PPC has a positive impact on a firm’s short-run employment. New workers are
predominantly lower educated men who have been previously employed in the construction
sector. A large set of robustness checks (i.e. excluding complaints, politically connected,
political donors, analysing changes in supplier selection method, contamination of the eval-
uation period, and seasonality) confirms that the estimated impact holds. Importantly, this
study offers many new insights compared to existing studies (most closely Gugler et al.,
2020). The initial estimated magnitude of the effect (2.5 employees [+/- 0.6]) is rather
small, and relatedly, the initial cost per job directly created is higher (at e71,400) than the
majority of other estimates for PPCs or public grants (Ferraz et al., 2015; Gugler et al.,
2020; Dvouletỳ et al., 2021; Srhoj and Zilic, 2021). This motivated further investigation of
potential mechanisms and heterogeneity that could explain such high cost per job in the
short-run.
This study shows a transparent and competitive auction procedure leads to cost savings
and lower political influence. Importantly, while a substantial share of PPCs are allocated
to politically connected firms, winners and runners-up are, on average, not statistically
different in political connections, and therefore any remaining difference in firms employment
growth is due to PPC. The present study does not find compelling evidence for information
leakage as an explanation for the lower estimates. Next, contrary to Ferraz et al. (2015), the
investigation of the longer-term effects finds evidence that the effects phase out in less than
a year, suggesting the longevity of effects or later-increasing effects do not explain the lower
short-term magnitude.
However, the study finds four factors that can explain the lower estimates. The first
two relate to the counterfactual behaviour of the runners-up. On the one hand, runners-up
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win more PPCs over the months after losing a close auction. These new PPCs won by the
runners-up are smaller on average and do not provide enough public revenue for the runner-
up to reach the winner’s level of public revenue received. On the other hand, runners-up
engage in substitution of the public for market revenue, as this study documents runners-up
start working more with households and private firms (i.e. private demand). However, both
the substitution and winning additional smaller PPCs do not enable the runner-up to reach
the closely-lost PPC. Dose response functions are estimated, and the results indicate non-
linearity in the effects of PPC on firms employment with respect to the PPC size. No evidence
is found for a positive impact of small PPCs on firms’ employment, and positive effects are
documented for larger PPCs, particularly for the largest PPCs. While the estimated effect
is increasing with the PPC size, the cost per job becomes more expensive. This suggests
chopping the PPCs into smaller contracts might not be beneficial for maximizing the effect
on firms’ employment; however, with larger PPCs, after a threshold, the effect per euro
decreases, which is why PPC size does not provide an explanation for the high cost per job
created. Heterogeneity of effects with respect to firms’ outsourcing and hiring decisions is
documented. In particular, the effect is concentrated in firms that conduct the majority of
work themselves, or firms that use a small share of agency workers. On average, firms employ
3% of the winning workforce, about four new employees per PPC, which gives the public
cost per job directly created at e45,200 [e34,200 - e66,200]. Tackling all the interesting
questions related to PPCs is beyond the scope of this study, but several future research
streams are suggested.
Future research could tackle the impact of PPC on the employment of winners’ suppliers.
In addition, investigation of PPC effects on other production function variables, i.e. inputs
like capital, intermediate inputs and technology; and outputs like value added and sales,
could yield interesting findings. Furthermore, research could estimate the effects of PPC on
firms in non-construction sectors (e.g. manufacturing, retail or service sectors), as well as the
effects of a change in political connections on resource allocation. Local and regional effects of
increased government spending (e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014) could be investigated,
as well as the micro-effects of ”mega” PPCs (e.g. significant highways or bridges [Holl,
2016]). Future research could also examine the effects of a change in political power on
bidders’ behaviour, competition and price markups in PPCs. Finally, potential bid rigging
activities require more analysis (e.g. Kawai et al., 2019). Extending our analysis to consider
these aspects is an exciting, yet difficult, avenue for future research.
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Table A1: Definition of non-political variables used in the analysis (continued)
Category Variable Description
Employment
Employees Number of employees within a firm (6 fortnights prior to
the auction results)
Employees, HE Number of employees with a higher education level (HE)
within a firm (6 fortnights prior to the auction results)
Employees, LE Number of employees with a lower education level (LE)
within a firm (6 fortnights prior to the auction results)
Hires Number of hires within a firm (per day, during the 6
fortnights period prior to the auction results)
Fires Number of fires within a firm (per day, during the 6 fort-
nights period prior to the auction results)
Tenure Number of days an average employee is employed in a
firm (6 fortnights prior to the auction results)
Employee age Age of an average employee (on the day he is employed)
that is employed in a firm (6 fortnights prior to the auc-
tion results)
Non-fixed term contracts Percentage of non-fixed term contracts within a firm (6
fortnights prior to the auction results)
Projects
Backlog extensive Number of government contracts won by a firm during
the 3 years prior to an auction (includes contracts from
whole 3 years prior)
Backlog intensive Value of government contracts won by a firm during the 3
years prior to an auction (includes contracts from whole
3 years prior) VAT is not included.
Distance to contracting authority Distance between contractors’ and firms’ headquarters
(air distance - in kilometers)
Balance sheet
Total assets Total assets of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year
financial reports prior to the auction results
Current assets Current assets of a firm according to the nearest end-of-
year financial reports prior to the auction results
Fixed assets Fixed assets of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year
financial reports prior to the auction results
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Table A1: Definition of non-political variables used in the analysis (continued)
Category Variable Description
Total liabilities Total liabilities of a firm according to the nearest end-of-
year financial reports prior to the auction results
Non-current liabilities Non-current liabilities of a firm according to the nearest
end-of-year financial reports prior to the auction results
Income statement
Revenue Revenue of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year
financial reports prior to the auction results
Market revenue Revenue of a firm (according to the nearest end-of-year
financial reports prior to the auction results) subtracted
by the ”Public revenue”
Public revenue Total value a firm won one year prior to the auction re-
sults within the PPC’s within our database. VAT is not
included
EBITDA EBITDA of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year
financial reports prior to the auction results
Profit Profit of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year fi-
nancial reports prior to the auction results
Depreciation Depreciation of a firm according to the nearest end-of-
year financial reports prior to the auction results
Interest paid Interest paid of a firm according to the nearest end-of-
year financial reports prior to the auction results
Productivity Revenue of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year fi-
nancial reports prior to the auction results over the num-
ber of employees within a firm 6 fortnights prior to the
auction results
Wage costs Wage costs of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year
financial reports prior to the auction results
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Table A1: Definition of non-political variables used in the analysis (continued)
Category Variable Description
Financial ratios
EBITDA over assets EBITDA over total assets of a firm according to the near-
est end-of-year financial reports prior to the auction re-
sults
Profit over assets Profit after tax over total assets of a firm according to the
nearest end-of-year financial reports prior to the auction
results
Debt ratio Total liabilities over total assets of a firm according to the
nearest end-of-year financial reports prior to the auction
results
LR liabilities over assets Non-current liabilities over total assets of a firm accord-
ing to the nearest end-of-year financial reports prior to
the auction results
Outsourcing over total expenses Total outsourcing (external-work) costs over the total
firms costs of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year
financial reports prior to the auction results
External labour over total labour
costs
Total cost of student workers, agency workers, subcon-
tractors & other one-off contractors over the total worker
expenses of a firm according to the nearest end-of-year
financial reports prior to the auction results
Education
(HE) Higher education level Requirements for a specific job vacancy, containing: spe-
cialized doctorate degree, doctorate degree, masters de-
gree (& specialized maters programs), bachelor’s degree
(LE) Lower education level Requirements for a specific job vacancy, any degree of ed-
ucation below the/not mentioned in the degrees required
for an HE classification
Win margin
|2nd best bids value−winning bids value|




Note: the base period is the beginning of the 6th fortnight
prior to the day of the auction results.
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Table A2: Political connection dummies
Match Name Dummies, equal to 1 if:
Donators A firm has ever donated to any political party according to our
database of donations.
Last name match
Reg. conn. (out of power) A firm has, within its management/owners, anyone with the same full
name as an ex-regional politician (substitutes of-, governors, member
of county councils) in the county of the firm’s headquarters.
Reg. conn. (in power) A firm has, within its management/owners, anyone with the same
last name as a current regional politician (substitutes of-, governors,
member of county councils) in the county of the firm’s headquarters.
Loc. conn. (out of power) A firm has, within its management/owners, anyone with the last name
as an ex-member of the local political representatives in the munici-
pality of the firm’s headquarters.
Loc. conn. (in power) A firm has, within its management/owners, anyone with the same
full name as a current member of the local pollitical representatives
in power in the municipality of the firm’s headquarters.
Full name match GONG/Nat. conn. A firm has, within its management/owners, anyone with the same full
name as an ex- or a current member of the national parliament or the
parties representatives.
Final dummies
Any Any of the previous dummies are 1.
Any (second order) Any of the managers/owners within firms where Any = 1 are members
of the management/owners.
Notes: ”(in power)” refers to the ruling party in the observed part of the state. The elections on the
regional & local level took place in 2013 & 2017, meaning we consider a politician ”in power” if
he was a mayor/deputy mayor/member of the local council.






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2015 339.7 40.6 11.9 31.1 9.5 15485 2.4 7.8 46.9
2016 351.2 44.8 12.8 34.6 10.3 13838 2.5 6.6 27.7
2017 366.4 40.5 11.0 31.0 9.4 11408 57.1 57.7 42.0
2018 383.0 46.6 12.2 36.6 10.0 18112 95.5 95.4 50.8
Notes: All monetary values are given in billion Kuna. Source: Statistical Reports on Public Procurement, link: http:
//www.javnanabava.hr/default.aspx?id=3425.
Column (3) shows the total PPC value awarded. (4) shows total PPC value awarded as % of GDP. (5) shows
the value of PPCs published at EOJN. (6) gives the value of all PPC which do not legally require a tendering
process (all PPC whose final value is under 250,000 HRK [with VAT]). (8) shows % of PPC awarded by MEAT
criteria, (9) does the same but comparing values of PPC. (10) simply looks at what % of PPC at EOJN have
their CPV start with 45xy.
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Table A4: Single bid auctions
(4) Single bids by exclusion Year 2016 2017 2018 Total
(1) All PPC Count 1412 1449 1378 4239
(2) Single bid Count 332 286 32 650
(3) Single bid Share 0.2351 0.1974 0.0232 0.1533
(4) Single bid Amount (in mil. e) 142.6631 322.7729 24.6659 490.1019
(5) Winners donating Share 0.1754 0.1388 0.0604 0.1455
(6) Winners pol. conn. Share 0.5367 0.7683 0.3626 0.6804
(7) Suspicious winners Share 0.1049 0.4696 0.3882 0.3593
(8) Ad 5, 6 & 7 Won Amount (in mil. e) 100.5075 285.874 19.732 406.1134
Notes: 4239 auctions are in the entire sample when we exclude only the auctions for which we do not
have the necessary data. Of those 4239, 650 were single bid auctions, however 332 more are
excluded, as they become single bid auctions because of invalid and/or excluded bids. Those 332
are not observed in single bid auctions above, they are represented below. VAT is included.
Table A5: Single bid auctions by exclusion
(4) Single bids by exclusion Year 2016 2017 2018 Total
(1) All PPC Count 1412 1449 1378 4239
(2) Single bid Count 52 68 212 332
(3) Single bid Share 0.0368 0.0469 0.1538 0.0783
(4) Single bid Amount (in mil. e) 42.1524 225.2118 180.6239 447.9881
(5) Winners donating Share 0.106 0.0837 0.2303 0.1449
(6) Winners pol. conn. Share 0.6498 0.9132 0.6713 0.7909
(7) Suspicious winners Share 0.2479 0.8 0.1095 0.4696
(8) Ad 5, 6 & 7 Won Amount (in mil. e) 30.4392 214.2173 139.5041 384.1605
Notes: Rows 5, 6 & 7 show the share of values of PPC won by each of the groups of single bidders
respectively. Row 5 shows the share of the total value awarded to single bidders with previous
donations to a political party, row 6 to single bidders with political connections (see 4.4.3), and
row 7 to single bidders which are deemed suspicious (firms formed 1 year or sooner before the
auction, firms with no employees, firms which won an auction that surpassed 70% of their last
years revenue). The last row shows the value that was awarded to firms in rows 5, 6 & 7 (overlap
is accounted for). VAT is included.
Table A6: Multiple bid auctions
(4) Single bids by exclusion Year 2016 2017 2018 Total
(1) All PPC Count 1412 1449 1378 4239
(2) Multiple bid Count 1028 1095 1134 3257
(3) Multiple bid Share 0.728 0.7557 0.8229 0.7683
(4) Multiple bid Amount (in mil. e) 921.6257 732.3651 1137.792 2791.7828
(5) Winners donating Share 0.1811 0.1423 0.1035 0.1393
(6) Winners pol. conn. Share 0.364 0.5113 0.2946 0.3744
(7) Suspicious winners Share 0.1041 0.0531 0.0864 0.0835
(8) Ad 5, 6 & 7 Won Amount (in mil. e) 443.5301 415.659 463.8711 1323.0602
Notes: We observe the 3257 auctions which had multiple valid bids. Of those we later on exclude ones
in which a winner or a runner-up is firm for which we do not have the necessary employment
data. We are left with 2859 auctions afterwards. VAT is included.
39
Table A7: Bidder quantity effect on winning bid (as % of beginning estimate)
Subsamples





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2 valid bids −0.074∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
3 valid bids −0.119∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
4 valid bids −0.147∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
(5 to 8) valid bids −0.178∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
(more than 8) valid bids −0.278∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023)
Mean beginning estimate 0.78 0.77 0.66 0.57 0.89 1.16
N 4.108 1.971 1.737 1.446 1.663 995
R2 0.167 0.099 0.154 0.170 0.239 0.186














Notes: We observe the entire sample of 4239 auctions, however we exclude 131 auctions as their
winning bid (as % of the beginning estimate) is in the top or bottom 1% of observations.
Meaning we observe 4108 auctions in column (1), and its subsamples in other columns.
Column (2), for example, regresses the ratio on the subsample of auctions which had either
1 or 2 valid bids, & the other remaining columns follow the same principle. Regression is
controlled for county, season, year & 4 digit CPV specific effects. Mean beginning estimate
is in mil. e.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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452331 Works on building highways
and roads
614 0.14 447.08 0.13 356.11 0.12 0.58 0.18
450000 Building (unspecified) 269 0.06 225.41 0.06 182.79 0.06 0.68 0.21
454540 Reconstruction and renova-
tion
201 0.05 117.36 0.03 97.25 0.03 0.48 0.2
452313 Works on constructing wa-
ter and sewer pipelines
191 0.05 228.83 0.07 212.03 0.07 1.11 0.26
452330 Construction works, works
on building foundations and
works on constructing sur-
face highway roads
165 0.04 154.72 0.04 112.3 0.04 0.68 0.17
452310 Works on constructing
pipelines, communication,
energy and water supply.
143 0.03 71.92 0.02 61.98 0.02 0.43 0.17
452332 Different works on surface
layer
136 0.03 43.59 0.01 35.94 0.01 0.26 0.12
454531 Maintenance 128 0.03 92.9 0.03 74.68 0.03 0.58 0.13
452000 Works on buildings or parts
of high-rise and low-rise
buildings
122 0.03 84.59 0.02 68.32 0.02 0.56 0.16
452321 Works on water supply
pipelines
93 0.02 53.85 0.02 40.09 0.01 0.43 0.19
In top 10 2062 0.49 1520.25 0.44 1241.49 0.42 0.6 0.19
Total 4239 1.00 3476.19 1.00 2983.9 1.00 0.7 0.18
Notes: All values are given in mil. e. The CPV distribution encompasses all 4239 auctions in the sample.
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Figure A1: PPC value & auctions awarded in auctions with multiple bidders
Auction bids by county of headquarters of:
All bids Winning bids Runner-up bids Other losing bids
a) b) c) d)
Value awarded by county of:
Winning bidders headquarters Procuring entity
e) f)
Notes: VAT is included.
43
Table A9: Auction summary
All auctions Close auctions (Within 10%) Close auctions (Within 6%) Close auctions (Within 4%)
Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median
Auction estimate 808.42 5957.64 220 902.82 5413.83 237.56 982.62 6373.25 233.33 923 6618.41 240
Winning bid 721.42 6467.31 178.51 804.7 5182.35 206.29 887.15 6121.14 203.4 832.5 6332.67 212.97
(Winning bid /
Auction estimate)
0.83 0.25 0.81 0.88 0.28 0.88 0.89 0.29 0.9 0.9 0.32 0.91
Runner-up bid 826.3 7672.3 209.88 837.57 5279.28 213.21 911.32 6222.02 209.45 844.13 6361.98 214.59
(Runner-up bid -
Winning bid)
104.88 1391.39 20.53 32.87 165.72 7.08 24.16 174.47 4.58 11.63 46.54 3.31
(Run.-up bid - Win. bid)
/Runner-up bid
0.1389 0.1657 0.0994 0.0423 0.0289 0.0388 0.0262 0.0175 0.0241 0.018 0.0118 0.016
Number of bidders 4 2.01 3 4.31 2.19 4 4.38 2.24 4 4.43 2.26 4
Notes: All monetary values are in thousands of euro. VAT is excluded. We observe only auctions for which both the employee data &
financial data is available.




All auctions Close auctions (Within 10%) Close auctions (Within 6%) Close auctions (Within 4%)
Auctions Value Auctions Value Auctions Value Auctions Value
No. Share Sum Share No. Share Sum Share No. Share Sum Share No. Share Sum Share
Dalmatia 380 0.13 247.95 0.12 212 0.15 132.84 0.11 133 0.13 97.94 0.11 94 0.13 38.75 0.06
City of Zagreb 1228 0.43 1243.96 0.6 582 0.41 722.54 0.63 401 0.4 563.86 0.64 298 0.4 408.31 0.67
Istria, Kvarner,
Gorski Kotar & Lika
420 0.15 200.1 0.1 222 0.15 117.48 0.1 163 0.16 78.79 0.09 122 0.17 61.27 0.1
Central Croatia
(w/o City of Zagreb)
434 0.15 191.82 0.09 221 0.15 84.83 0.07 152 0.15 63.04 0.07 117 0.16 40.92 0.07
Slavonia 396 0.14 178.62 0.09 199 0.14 97.99 0.08 145 0.15 78.3 0.09 106 0.14 64.42 0.1
Number of auctions 2859 1 2062.45 1 1436 1 1155.68 1 994 1 881.93 1 737 1 613.67 1
Notes: All monetary values are in millions of euro. VAT is excluded. We observe only auctions for which both the employee data &
financial data is available.
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Table A11: Comparison of winners, runner-ups & others before the auction results
Category Variable Winners Runners up Diff. (3)-(4) Ranks > 2 Diff. (3)-(6) Ranks > 1 Diff. (3)-(8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Employment Observations 2859 2859 4514 7373
Employees 115.43 124.82 −9.39 125.19 −9.76 125.05 −9.62
Employees, HE 18.23 19.22 −0.99 18.57 −0.34 18.82 −0.59
Employees, LE 97.2 105.6 −8.4 106.62 −9.42 106.22 −9.03
Hires 0.14 0.15 −0.01 0.16 −0.01 0.15 −0.01
Fires 0.14 0.15 −0.01 0.15 −0.01 0.15 −0.01
Tenure (in days) 1232.42 1246.32 −13.9 1169.29 63.13* 1199.14 33.28
Employee age (in years) 35.15 35 0.15 35.18 −0.03 35.11 0.04
Non-fixed term contracts (in %) 41.97 41.04 0.93 39.47 2.5*** 40.08 1.89***
Projects Backlog extensive 22.98 25.53 −2.55** 26.24 −3.26*** 25.97 −2.98***
Backlog intensive 12.67 13.39 −0.72 13.21 −0.54 13.28 −0.61
Distance to contracting authority 68.45 77.17 −8.72** 72.28 −3.83 74.18 −5.73**
Political connections Public firm 0.07 0.05 0.02** 0.04 0.03*** 0.04 0.02***
GONG/National match 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.02* 0.15 0.02*
Regional match (in power) 0.24 0.22 0.02 0.2 0.04*** 0.21 0.03**
Local match (in power) 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.24 0.02
Any match 0.47 0.47 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.46 0.01
Any match (second order) 0.73 0.74 −0.01 0.73 0 0.74 0
Donator 0.14 0.14 0 0.15 −0.01 0.15 −0.01
Balance sheet Total assets 11.32 12.57 −1.24 11.98 −0.65 12.2 −0.88
Current assets 5.73 5.85 −0.12 5.76 −0.03 5.79 −0.06
Fixed assets 5.59 6.72 −1.13 6.22 −0.62 6.41 −0.82
Total liabilities 5.17 6.1 −0.93 6.27 −1.1 6.2 −1.03
Non-current liabilities 1.18 1.89 −0.7 1.88 −0.7 1.88 −0.7
Income statement Revenue 12.17 12.29 −0.12 12.37 −0.21 12.34 −0.17
EBITDA 1.17 1.09 0.08 0.96 0.21 1.01 0.16
Profit 0.42 0.42 0 0.34 0.07 0.37 0.05
Depreciation 0.51 0.43 0.08 0.36 0.15 0.39 0.12
Interest paid 0.15 0.17 −0.02 0.18 −0.04 0.18 −0.03
Wage costs 1.59 1.74 −0.15 1.7 −0.11 1.72 −0.12
Productivity 0.11 0.12 −0.02 0.13 −0.02 0.12 −0.02*
Financial ratios EBITDA over assets 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.01*** 0.12 0.01**
Profit over assets 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01*** 0.05 0.01*
Debt ratio 0.55 0.63 −0.08 0.55 0 0.58 −0.03
LR liabilities over assets 0.11 0.12 0 0.11 0 0.11 0
Outsourcing over total expenses 0.3 0.31 0 0.32 −0.02*** 0.32 −0.01**
External labour over total labour costs 0.33 0.33 −0.01 0.36 −0.04*** 0.35 −0.03***
Notes: The first row represents the data after we exclude any auction in which the winner/runner-up is a firm for which we do not have the
necessary employment data. The second notion of observations is a subset of those auctions, the one for which we have data on other
financial data. For an explanation of all the variables see Table A1. All monetary values are given in mil. Euro.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the .1, 1, 5 percent level.
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Table A12: Comparison of winners, runner-ups & others before the auction results - in close auctions (within 10%)
Category Variable Winners Runners up Diff. (3)-(4) Ranks > 2 Diff. (3)-(6) Ranks > 1 Diff. (3)-(8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Employment Observations 1436 1436 2719 4155
Employees 123.93 128.12 −4.19 123.28 0.65 124.95 −1.02
Employees, HE 18.19 20.2 −2.01 18.84 −0.64 19.31 −1.12
Employees, LE 105.74 107.91 −2.17 104.45 1.29 105.65 0.09
Hires 0.16 0.16 0 0.16 0 0.16 0
Fires 0.16 0.16 0 0.16 0 0.16 0
Tenure (in days) 1279.07 1257.69 21.38 1203.43 75.64 1222.14 56.93
Employee age (in years) 35.14 35.23 −0.09 35.33 −0.19 35.29 −0.15
Non-fixed term contracts (in %) 39.15 40.07 −0.92 38.03 1.11 38.74 0.41
Projects Backlog extensive 25.7 26.34 −0.64 27.75 −2.06 27.26 −1.57
Backlog intensive 14.42 13.72 0.7 13.74 0.67 13.73 0.68
Distance to contracting authority 69.58 73.65 −4.07 72.03 −2.46 72.59 −3.01
Political connections Public firm 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.02** 0.05 0.02**
GONG/National match 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.04** 0.16 0.03**
Regional match (in power) 0.24 0.22 0.02 0.21 0.03* 0.21 0.03*
Local match (in power) 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.26 0.01
Any match 0.49 0.47 0.02 0.47 0.02 0.47 0.02
Any match (second order) 0.75 0.73 0.02 0.74 0.01 0.74 0.01
Donator 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.01
Balance sheet Observations 1399 1370 2639 4009
Total assets 11.87 14.18 −2.31 11.43 0.44 12.37 −0.5
Current assets 5.82 6.32 −0.49 5.88 −0.06 6.03 −0.21
Fixed assets 6.05 7.86 −1.81 5.55 0.5 6.34 −0.29
Total liabilities 5.87 6.71 −0.84 6.22 −0.35 6.39 −0.52
Non-current liabilities 1.27 2.21 −0.94 1.73 −0.46 1.9 −0.62
Income statement Revenue 13.19 12.49 0.7 12.6 0.58 12.56 0.62
EBITDA 1.11 1.22 −0.11 0.92 0.18 1.02 0.08
Profit 0.34 0.44 −0.1 0.31 0.03 0.36 −0.01
Depreciation 0.51 0.5 0.01 0.35 0.15 0.4 0.11
Interest paid 0.17 0.2 −0.03 0.19 −0.02 0.19 −0.02
Wage costs 1.69 1.76 −0.07 1.64 0.05 1.68 0.01
Productivity 0.11 0.13 −0.01 0.13 −0.01 0.13 −0.01
Financial ratios EBITDA over assets 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.01*** 0.11 0.01
Profit over assets 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01* 0.04 0.01
Debt ratio 0.55 0.57 −0.02 0.55 0 0.56 −0.01
Outsourcing over total expenses 0.31 0.3 0 0.32 −0.02** 0.31 −0.01
External labour over total labour costs 0.33 0.32 0.01 0.36 −0.03** 0.35 −0.02
Notes: The first row represents the data after we exclude any auction in which the winner/runner-up is a firm for which we do not have the
necessary employment data. The second notion of observations is a subset of those auctions, the one for which we have data on other
financial data. For an explanation of all the variables see Table A1. All monetary values are given in mil. Euro.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the .1, 1, 5 percent level.
Figure A2: Complaints by county
Notes: the data encompasses the entire database of complaints. It shows the distribution of less than 16,089 complaints by
county of the procuring entity (for which we have the data on their location). a) shows the % of complaints, b) shows the total
number of complaints by county of procuring entity.
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Within 8% Within 6% Within 4% 4% to 0.5%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-5 0.131 0.183 0.300 0.145 0.265 0.327
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
-4 0.206 0.390 0.488 0.379 0.533 0.638
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
-3 0.165 0.384 0.391 0.286 0.478 0.445
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
-2 0.325 0.678 0.695 0.515 0.780 0.551
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
-1 0.382 0.797 0.730 0.500 0.839 0.662
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
0 0.635 1.110∗∗ 1.014∗ 0.728 1.029 0.939
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
1 0.934 1.495∗∗∗ 1.421∗∗ 1.056∗ 1.135 1.065
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
2 1.170∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.482∗∗∗ 1.183∗ 1.168 1.105
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
3 1.716∗∗∗ 2.008∗∗∗ 1.853∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗ 1.592∗∗ 1.495∗
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
4 1.820∗∗∗ 2.236∗∗∗ 1.960∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗ 1.925∗∗∗ 1.875∗∗
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
5 1.794∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗ 2.180∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗ 2.064∗∗∗ 2.167∗∗∗
(0.649) (0.551) (0.571) (0.636) (0.733) (0.798)
Won (dummy) −0.336 −0.272 −0.161 0.017 −0.238 −0.082
(0.463) (0.395) (0.410) (0.458) (0.531) (0.579)
Log. of employees −19.073∗∗∗ −20.258∗∗∗ −17.254∗∗∗ −15.041∗∗∗ −13.078∗∗∗ −14.506∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.451) (0.460) (0.491) (0.553) (0.651)
Mean employees 119.4382 124.2338 120.9359 122.4989 123.4156 122.0153
N 62.544 31.872 27.720 21.912 16.140 13.332
R2 0.294 0.394 0.396 0.432 0.466 0.497














Notes: Column (1) shows the estimates for the full sample. Other columns - subsamples of close auctions
are constructed according to the win margin. The win margin of 10%, 8%, 6%, 4% and 4% to 0.5%
based on the win margin definition (see method).
The dependent variable is employment growth at firm-auction level in each fortnight period (from
-6 to 6). The model is estimated with the equation (1). The independent variables are the fortnight
periods, the ’Won (dummy)’ for auction winner, ’Log. of employees’ is the natural log of the firms’
number of employees -6 fortnights before the auction and firm specific fixed effects are included.
The estimates are calculated using the package (’lfe’, Gaure, 2013) and show the LATE, difference
in employment growth rates between winners and runner-ups in close auction sample. The point
estimates and standard errors are transformed to absolute employment increase based on the coeffi-
cients and the mean number of employees (given in ’Mean employees’) at the beginning of the -6th
fortnight.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-5 0.183 0.672 0.214 0.057 0.088 0.132 0.285
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
-4 0.390 0.998 0.508 0.068 0.133 0.324 0.529
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
-3 0.384 0.967 0.436 0.054 0.123 0.309 0.451
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
-2 0.678 1.230 0.777 0.251 0.295 0.606 0.702
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
-1 0.797 1.380 0.848 0.246 0.279 0.727 0.778
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
0 1.110∗∗ 1.961∗ 1.108∗ 0.558 0.552 1.044∗∗ 1.038∗
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
1 1.495∗∗∗ 2.286∗∗ 1.523∗∗ 0.798∗ 0.758∗ 1.433∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
2 1.602∗∗∗ 2.651∗∗ 1.554∗∗ 0.903∗∗ 0.799∗∗ 1.542∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
3 2.008∗∗∗ 3.605∗∗∗ 1.754∗∗∗ 1.270∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗ 1.708∗∗∗
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
4 2.236∗∗∗ 3.664∗∗∗ 2.017∗∗∗ 1.394∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 2.023∗∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
5 2.450∗∗∗ 4.049∗∗∗ 2.131∗∗∗ 1.467∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ 2.164∗∗∗ 1.953∗∗∗
(0.551) (1.128) (0.626) (0.440) (0.390) (0.525) (0.563)
Won (dummy) −0.272 −0.675 −0.108 −0.205 −0.202 −0.241 −0.286
(0.395) (0.829) (0.453) (0.317) (0.281) (0.377) (0.404)
Log. of employees −20.258∗∗∗ −45.128∗∗∗ −18.127∗∗∗ −9.368∗∗∗ −9.588∗∗∗ −16.298∗∗∗ −36.388∗∗∗
(0.451) (1.435) (0.479) (0.301) (0.279) (0.403) (0.626)
Mean employees 124.2338 116.0818 122.621 63.4487 61.3261 104.6671 129.7528
N 31.872 7.776 23.364 16.740 18.768 26.964 29.856
R2 0.394 0.556 0.368 0.355 0.353 0.405 0.421

















Notes:Column (1) shows the estimates for the full sample. Columns (2) and (3) show estimates without frequent
complaints. The top 5 CPV 4-digit codes with most complaints are 4523, 4521, 4545, 4500 and 4526, which
are excluded from the regression in column (2), and the county with most complaints is the City of Zagreb,
which we exclude and show the estimates in column (3). Column (4) uses only the firms which are not in
any way politically connected (first-order). Column (5) excludes firms which donated to any political party.
Column (6) excludes any suspicious firm (see Table A4).
The dependent variable is employment growth at firm-auction level in each fortnight period (from -6 to 6).
The model is estimated with the equation (1). The independent variables are the fortnight periods, the ’Won
(dummy)’ for auction winner, ’Log. of employees’ is the natural log of the firms’ number of employees -6
fortnights before the auction and firm specific fixed effects are included. The estimates are calculated using
the package (’lfe’, Gaure, 2013) and show the LATE, difference in employment growth rates between winners
and runner-ups in close auction sample. The point estimates and standard errors are transformed to absolute
employment increase based on the coefficients and the mean number of employees (given in ’Mean employees’)
at the beginning of the -6th fortnight. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Procuring entity No. Share
4 digit
CPV code
No. Share No. Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grad Zagreb 615 0.04 4523 662 0.32 1314 0.4
Hrvatske ceste d.o.o. 408 0.03 4521 205 0.1 422 0.13
HAC d.o.o. 347 0.02 4545 137 0.07 304 0.09
ZG holding d.o.o. 320 0.02 4500 257 0.12 209 0.06
Hrvatske vode 317 0.02 4526 104 0.05 198 0.06
HEP-ODS d.o.o. 284 0.02 4524 137 0.07 143 0.04
HŽ-Infrast. d.o.o. 257 0.02 4531 115 0.06 120 0.04
Hrvatske šume d.o.o. 252 0.02 4522 97 0.05 121 0.04
KBC Zagreb 243 0.02 4520 48 0.02 98 0.03
HP d.d. 235 0.01 4511 74 0.04 82 0.03
In top 10 3278 0.22 In top 10 1836 0.89 3011 0.92
Total 16089 1 Total 2063 1 3257 1
Notes: The table shows the top 10 procuring entities that received the most complaints, as well as
the top 10 4 digit CPV codes with the most complaints. (5) & (6) show the occurrence of
complaints through the 4 digit CPV codes. (7) & (8) show the CPV distribution through
our non-filtered database of auctions. CPV’s are ordered by column (8).




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sum 2937695.86 1931103.91 3957 2937695.86 3957 2922167.79 108 341382.59
Mean 742.4 921.33 63.82 47382.19 1.16 860.22 1.57 4947.57
Std. dev. 1522.58 1868.65 269.59 246989.47 0.43 2097.49 0.88 7459.83
10th 26.67 66.67 1 340 1 26.67 1 400
50th 266.67 266.67 6.5 1897.53 1 266.67 1 1733.33
90th 1992 2400 98.2 44251.93 2 2242.67 3 14133.33
Max 26666.67 26666.67 2095 1929770.58 4 53333.33 4 34786.67
Obs. 3957 2091 62 62 3397 3397 69 69
Notes: The first column (1) shows info on all 3957 donations to any party preceding the parliamentary elections in
2016 & those in 2017, while the second (2) shows donations to the ruling party after the election (HDZ). (3) &
(4) examine donations by the party which they target. (5) & (6) do the same but instead by the donation origin
(560 donations had no identification number connected to them but none of them was donations by firms, those
are excluded, hence the lower observation number). (7) & (8) look at only the donations given by construction
firms within our sample of PPC’s. All monetary values are in euro.
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Table A17: Political connections














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sum 141 166 179 202 195 373 675
Mean 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.35 0.64
Std. dev. 0.34 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.48
Obs. 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071 1071
Notes: The first 5 columns show statistics for any connection to politicians using a dummy of 1 for a full name match
or a last name match. (6) & (7) give an overview of all political connections anytime, and to politicians in power
in 2013– (overlap is accounted for). A more detailed explanation of the variables: Table A2.
Table A18: Auction criteria characteristics
Sample Variable Sum Mean Std. dev. 10th 50th 90th Obs. Raw obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LP & MEAT
Winning bid 2062.55 0.72 6.47 0.06 0.18 0.88 2859 3257
Bid of runner-up 2362.39 0.83 7.67 0.07 0.21 1.01 2859 3257
Est. value 2310.79 0.81 5.96 0.08 0.22 1.07 2859 3257
No. of bids 10232 4 2.01 2 3 7 10232 11873
LP
Winning bid 1276.89 0.73 4.8 0.06 0.18 0.95 1758 1983
Bid of runner-up 1368.14 0.78 4.94 0.07 0.2 1.01 1758 1983
Est. value 1163.28 0.83 5.02 0.08 0.21 1.07 1758 1983
No. of bids 6739 4.16 2.14 2 4 7 6739 7743
MEAT
Winning bid 785.66 0.71 8.48 0.05 0.18 0.79 1101 1274
Bid of runner-up 994.25 0.9 10.68 0.07 0.24 1.01 1101 1274
Est. value 856.69 0.78 7.21 0.08 0.24 1 1101 1274
No. of bids 3493 3.74 1.76 2 3 6 3493 4130
Notes: The table shows auction data characteristics across auctions awarded via LP & MEAT, separately & when
grouped together, after the further exclusion. The last two columns show the observations, the last column
shows the observations before the exclusion of the bids for which we do not have the necessary financial &
employment data for the analysis, the Obs. column shows the observations after the exclusion. All monetary
values are in mil. Euro. VAT is not included.
Table A19: MEAT criteria distribution
Price crit. No. Share Cost crit. No. Share Quality crit. No. Share Other crit. No. Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
90 619 0.61 more than 30 7 0.01 more than 30 30 0.03 more than 10 3 0.00
80 to 89 285 0.28 11 to 30 90 0.09 11 to 30 281 0.28 10 2 0.00
70 to 79 71 0.07 10 91 0.09 10 551 0.54 5 1 0.00
less than 70 46 0.05 0 to 9 833 0.82 0 to 9 159 0.16 0 1015 0.99
Notes: The table shows MEAT criteria distribution of auctions for which we have the criteria data. The observed
dataset contains 3493 bids across 1101 auctions which were awarded via the MEAT criteria. Of those 1101
auctions, we have the criteria data for 1021 of them, for which the distribution is shown above.
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Table A20: The impact of PPC on Firms’ Employment: LP and MEAT samples
Entire sample LP sample MEAT sample
All Within 10% All Within 10% All Within 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-5 0.131 0.183 0.134 0.262 0.126 −0.220
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
-4 0.206 0.390 0.189 0.425 0.231 0.208
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
-3 0.165 0.384 0.087 0.390 0.283 0.348
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
-2 0.325 0.678 0.472 0.754 0.101 0.283
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
-1 0.382 0.797 0.648 0.902 −0.022 0.245
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
0 0.635 1.110∗∗ 0.907∗ 1.247∗∗ 0.219 0.394
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
1 0.934 1.495∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 1.509∗∗∗ 0.450 1.402
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
2 1.170∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.391∗∗∗ 1.517∗∗∗ 0.831 2.014
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
3 1.716∗∗∗ 2.008∗∗∗ 1.626∗∗∗ 1.884∗∗∗ 1.841 2.608∗∗
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
4 1.820∗∗∗ 2.236∗∗∗ 1.606∗∗∗ 2.028∗∗∗ 2.132 3.264∗∗
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
5 1.794∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗ 1.618∗∗∗ 2.219∗∗∗ 2.046 3.593∗∗∗
(0.649) (0.551) (0.474) (0.557) (1.406) (1.282)
Won (dummy) −0.336 −0.272 −0.469 −0.681∗ −0.231 −0.677
(0.463) (0.395) (0.339) (0.399) (1.015) (0.967)
Log. of employees −19.073∗∗∗ −20.258∗∗∗ −44.876∗∗∗ −44.117∗∗∗ −16.392∗∗∗ −16.873∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.451) (0.580) (0.727) (0.999) (0.766)
Mean employees 119.4382 124.2338 122.5497 126.6245 114.3798 110.2171
N 62.544 31.872 38.724 27.228 23.820 4.644
R2 0.294 0.394 0.458 0.476 0.305 0.497














Notes: The dependent variable is employment growth at firm-auction level in each fortnight period
(from -6 to 6). The model is estimated with the equation (1). The independent variables
are the fortnight periods, the ’Won (dummy)’ for auction winner, ’Log. of employees’ is the
natural log of the firms’ number of employees -6 fortnights before the auction and firm specific
fixed effects are included. The estimates are calculated using the package (’lfe’, Gaure, 2013)
and show the LATE, difference in employment growth rates between winners and runner-ups
in close auction sample. The point estimates and standard errors are transformed to absolute
employment increase based on the coefficients and the mean number of employees (given in
’Mean employees’) at the beginning of the -6th fortnight.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Close winner −0.023 0.006 −0.179∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.278∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.401∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.421∗∗∗ 0.016
(within 10%) (0.037) (0.016) (0.063) (0.030) (0.085) (0.038) (0.102) (0.045) (0.119) (0.051)
N 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674
R2 0.312 0.306 0.506 0.423 0.656 0.615 0.726 0.678 0.757 0.722
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.087 0.350 0.240 0.548 0.493 0.639 0.576 0.681 0.634
Residual Std. Error
(df = 2032)
0.817 0.365 1.419 0.669 1.898 0.839 2.280 1.011 2.668 1.150
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of awarded PPC in a given period following a close auction victory. It is split by
single- and multiple-bidder auctions & by 5 time-periods. Its independent variable is a dummy (which is equal to 1 if the
bidder is a victor only in a close auction, and 0 if the bidder is a runner-up in a close auction). The control variable is unique
firm ids (OIB).
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Close winner −0.437 0.116 −0.803∗∗∗ 0.056 −0.644∗∗∗ 0.295 −0.942∗∗∗ 0.219 −0.961∗∗∗ 0.011
(within 10%) (0.286) (0.179) (0.282) (0.238) (0.247) (0.240) (0.218) (0.241) (0.199) (0.235)
N 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674 2.674
R2 0.304 0.296 0.485 0.420 0.594 0.562 0.659 0.601 0.688 0.647
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.074 0.322 0.237 0.466 0.424 0.552 0.476 0.589 0.535
Residual Std. Error
(df = 2032)
6.397 3.991 6.302 5.328 5.530 5.362 4.872 5.393 4.446 5.264
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log value of awarded PPC in a given period following a close auction victory. It is
split by single- and multiple-bidder auctions & by 5 time-periods. Its independent variable is a dummy (which is equal to 1
if the bidder is a victor only in a close auction, and 0 if the bidder is a runner-up in a close auction). The control variable
is unique firm ids (OIB).
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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+ window + month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-5 0.183 0.241 0.075 −0.466 0.183 0.183
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
-4 0.390 0.613 −0.005 −0.428 0.390 0.390
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
-3 0.384 0.528 −0.024 −0.383 0.384 0.384
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
-2 0.678 0.647 0.157 −0.048 0.678 0.678
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
-1 0.797 0.655 0.240 0.067 0.797 0.797
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
0 1.110∗∗ 1.047∗ 0.420 0.558 1.110∗∗ 1.110∗∗
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
1 1.495∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗ 0.710 1.147 1.495∗∗∗ 1.495∗∗∗
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
2 1.602∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗ 1.100 1.486∗ 1.602∗∗∗ 1.602∗∗∗
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
3 2.008∗∗∗ 1.477∗∗ 1.837∗∗ 1.825∗∗ 2.008∗∗∗ 2.008∗∗∗
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
4 2.236∗∗∗ 1.645∗∗∗ 1.906∗∗ 1.986∗∗ 2.236∗∗∗ 2.236∗∗∗
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
5 2.450∗∗∗ 1.610∗∗ 1.884∗∗ 2.860∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗
(0.551) (0.629) (0.915) (0.853) (0.487) (0.549)
Won (dummy) −0.272 −0.296 −0.221 −1.608∗∗ −0.353 −0.273
(0.395) (0.453) (0.656) (0.653) (0.375) (0.394)
Log. of employees −20.258∗∗∗ −16.182∗∗∗ −18.422∗∗∗ −7.574∗∗∗ −17.242∗∗∗ −20.225∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.484) (0.697) (0.492) (0.507) (0.451)
Mean employees 124.2338 123.1657 117.4026 85.7815 124.2338 124.2338
N 31.872 22.092 40.452 7.524 31.872 31.872
R2 0.394 0.456 0.295 0.495 0.545 0.398














Notes: Columns (2) and (3) split the sample in 2 parts, column (2) contains each auction awarded
from April to (including) October. Column (4) examines the effect on the victors whose
only winning bid during the next 3 months is from the observed auction. Final two columns
include the value a bidder won during the next 3 months (in column (5)), and month in
which the auction was awarded (column (6)) as additional control variables.
The dependent variable is employment growth at firm-auction level in each fortnight period
(from -6 to 6). The model is estimated with the equation (1). The independent variables
are the fortnight periods, the ’Won (dummy)’ for auction winner, ’Log. of employees’ is the
natural log of the firms’ number of employees -6 fortnights before the auction and firm specific
fixed effects are included. The estimates are calculated using the package (’lfe’, Gaure, 2013)
and show the LATE, difference in employment growth rates between winners and runner-ups
in close auction sample. The point estimates and standard errors are transformed to absolute
employment increase based on the coefficients and the mean number of employees (given in
’Mean employees’) at the beginning of the -6th fortnight.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Figure A3: Histograms for winner distribution by timing (in minutes)
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Figure A4: Histograms for timing by political connection distribution by auctions size (in minutes)
Small auctions (below ∼ 2mil.euro) Large auctions (over ∼ 2mil.euro)
Table A24: Bidder distribution in 171 auctions examined in timing
Pol. conn. Pol. conn. Donators Donators Sus. firms Sus. firms
count share count share count share
Winners
Dummy = 0 96 0.56 142 0.83 160 0.94
Dummy = 1 75 0.44 29 0.17 11 0.06
No dummy 171 1 171 1 171 1
Runner-ups
Dummy = 0 18 0.11 153 0.89 171 1.00
Dummy = 1 153 0.89 18 0.11 0 0.00
No dummy 171 1 171 1 171 1
Both
Dummy = 0 114 0.33 295 0.86 331 0.97
Dummy = 1 228 0.67 47 0.14 11 0.03
No dummy 342 1 342 1 342 1
Notes: The dummy is auction specific, and equal to 1 if the winning bid was received before the
runner-ups, 0 otherwise.
Table A25: Bid timing
Time difference (in minutes)
Dummy Total Dummy = 0 Dummy = 1
Min. 0.00 −287.57 0.02 −287.57
1st Qu. 0.00 −17.71 0.84 −24.00
Median 0.00 0.02 5.67 −17.94
3rd Qu. 1.00 5.67 24.00 −1.17
Max. 1.00 432.00 432.00 0.00
Mean 0.50 −2.59 27.47 −33.00
Notes: The table shows the bid timing data on a sample of close bids for which the exact receival
time of each bid was available. We examine 268 auctions in 2018, of which the bid timing
data was available for 171 (63.81%). The dummy is auction specific, and equal to 1 if the
winning bid was received before the runner-ups, 0 otherwise. The time difference represents
the time difference between the receival time of the winning bid & the receival time of the
runner-up bid (which is negative if the winning bid was received first).
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Table A26: Long-term effects on employment
Main
(within 10%)
Within 8% Within 6% Within 4% 4% to 0.5%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-5 0.181 0.297 0.141 0.260 0.321
-4 0.397 0.495 0.387 0.547 0.654
-3 0.409 0.417 0.319 0.527 0.502
-2 0.709 0.728 0.556 0.840 0.620
-1 0.829 0.764 0.541 0.901 0.735
0 1.139 1.044 0.763 1.085 1.004
1 1.525∗ 1.452∗ 1.093 1.192 1.131
2 1.624∗ 1.502∗ 1.206 1.209 1.151
3 2.023∗∗ 1.866∗∗ 1.639∗ 1.620 1.526
4 2.241∗∗ 1.962∗∗ 1.801∗ 1.936∗ 1.884∗
5 2.450∗∗∗ 2.175∗∗ 1.939∗∗ 2.063∗∗ 2.163∗∗
6 2.384∗∗∗ 2.186∗∗ 1.909∗∗ 2.093∗∗ 2.148∗
7 2.229∗∗ 2.020∗∗ 1.805∗ 2.164∗∗ 2.162∗∗
8 1.952∗∗ 1.751∗∗ 1.614∗ 2.048∗∗ 1.923∗
9 1.930∗∗ 1.635∗ 1.598∗ 1.877∗ 1.698
10 2.037∗∗ 1.487∗ 1.408 1.662 1.403
11 2.143∗∗ 1.482∗ 1.393 1.672 1.165
12 1.786∗∗ 1.111 1.004 1.409 0.747
13 1.828∗∗ 1.087 1.033 1.378 0.699
14 1.924∗∗ 1.041 0.911 1.410 0.827
15 1.998∗∗ 1.168 1.085 1.489 0.743
16 1.813∗∗ 0.906 0.820 1.248 0.430
17 1.592∗ 0.602 0.438 0.706 −0.168
18 1.694∗ 0.536 0.567 1.027 0.290
19 1.509∗ 0.361 0.646 1.079 0.382
20 1.119 −0.109 0.386 0.781 0.175
Won (dummy) −0.171 −0.076 −0.004 −0.311 0.175
(0.632) (0.622) (0.661) (0.734) (0.787)
Log. of employees −36.671∗∗∗ −59.994∗∗∗ −60.187∗∗∗ −56.725∗∗∗ −59.739∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.661) (0.702) (0.808) (0.897)
Mean employees 124.3356 121.0558 122.6488 123.6177 122.2624
N 71.766 62.100 49.113 36.207 29.943
R2 0.447 0.483 0.507 0.536 0.569












Notes: The dependent variable is employment growth at firm-auction level in each fortnight
period (from -6 to 20). The model is estimated with the equation (2). The independent
variables are the fortnight periods, the ’Won (dummy)’ for auction winner, ’Log. of
employees’ is the natural log of the firms’ number of employees -6 fortnights before the
auction and firm specific fixed effects are included. The estimates are calculated using
the package (’lfe’, Gaure, 2013) and show the LATE, difference in employment growth
rates between winners and runner-ups in close auction sample. The point estimates
and standard errors are transformed to absolute employment increase based on the
coefficients and the mean number of employees (given in ’Mean employees’) at the
beginning of the -6th fortnight.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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Public revenue Market revenue Public revenue Market revenue Public revenue Market revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PPC win −0.087 0.021 0.543∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗ 0.006
(0.091) (0.015) (0.074) (0.012) (0.115) (0.009)
N 3.118 2.659 3.118 2.778 3.118 1.507
R2 0.919 0.973 0.917 0.980 0.878 0.996














Notes: OLS models on the subsample of close auction within 10% win margin. Both dependent variables, the public
revenue and the market revenue are in natural logs. Main independent variable is a dummy indicating whether a
firm is winner or runner-up in an auction. Period t-1 is the accounting year before the year of auction result, t is
year of auction result, and t+1 year after. Unit of observation is firm-auction. All models include firm fixed effects
and a control variable for firm size (number of employees).
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
Table A28: Effects of winning a PPC on growth in market and public revenue: close auction sample
Period (t)
- period (t - 1)
Period (t + 1)
- period (t - 1)
Public revenue Market revenue Public revenue Market revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPC win 0.630∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.190 −0.014
(0.129) (0.023) (0.163) (0.014)
N 3.118 2.468 3.118 1.427
R2 0.808 0.789 0.763 0.967
Adjusted R2 0.732 0.695 0.670 0.945
Residual Std. Error 2.968 (df = 2239) 0.456 (df = 1709) 3.751 (df = 2239) 0.189 (df = 851)
Notes: OLS models on the subsample of close auction within 10% win margin. Both dependent variables, the
public revenue and the market revenue are calculated as the difference in natural logs between periods t
and t-1 and t+1 and t-1. Period t-1 is the accounting year before the year of auction result, t is year
of auction result, and t+1 year after. Unit of observation is firm-auction. Main independent variable is
a dummy indicating whether a firm is winner or runner-up in an auction. All models include firm fixed
effects and a control variable for firm size (number of employees).
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
Figure A5: PPC value won vs. market value acquired
a) b)
Notes: the X-axis represents the ”win margin” of a bid, it is essentially the criteria we use for defining ”closeness” in an auction
(see method), only we multiply it by -1 if the bid is a losing one. The Y-axis represents the natural log of the total procurement
value won by a firm, graph a), and on graph b) the natural log of the firms revenue in the examined year. Points represent bins
which are formed according to the win margin (sizes of 0.0025).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-5 0.183 0.333 0.191 0.172 −0.328
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
-4 0.390 0.194 0.684 −0.304 −0.350
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
-3 0.384 0.259 0.582 −0.061 0.212
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
-2 0.678 0.929 0.703 0.415 0.704
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
-1 0.797 1.017 0.715 0.760 1.589
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
0 1.110∗∗ 0.896 0.991 1.449 2.376
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
1 1.495∗∗∗ 1.003 1.364∗∗ 1.997∗ 3.218
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
2 1.602∗∗∗ 0.664 1.493∗∗ 2.366∗∗ 3.876
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
3 2.008∗∗∗ 0.854 1.988∗∗∗ 2.481∗∗ 4.336
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
4 2.236∗∗∗ 0.473 2.323∗∗∗ 2.801∗∗ 4.804∗
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
5 2.450∗∗∗ 0.360 2.433∗∗∗ 2.791∗∗ 7.355∗∗∗
(0.551) (1.043) (0.640) (1.168) (2.720)
Won (dummy) −0.272 0.616 −0.372 0.018 −2.606
(0.395) (0.785) (0.462) (0.852) (2.007)
Log. of employees −20.258∗∗∗ −37.265∗∗∗ −13.381∗∗∗ −39.694∗∗∗ −50.210∗∗∗
(0.451) (1.625) (0.455) (1.603) (3.319)
Mean employees 124.2338 93.2281 107.1458 147.6345 208.8068
N 31.872 4.104 18.276 6.600 3.540
R2 0.394 0.568 0.423 0.505 0.465












Notes: Column (1) shows the estimates for the main sample of auctions within 10%. Columns
2-5 show results for PPC auctions depending on the estimated PPC value and pre-defined
dosages.
The dependent variable is employment growth at firm-auction level in each fortnight period
(from -6 to 20). The model is estimated with the equation (2). The independent variables
are the fortnight periods, the ’Won (dummy)’ for auction winner, ’Log. of employees’ is
the natural log of the firms’ number of employees -6 fortnights before the auction and
firm specific fixed effects are included. The estimates are calculated using the package
(’lfe’, Gaure, 2013) and show the LATE, difference in employment growth rates between
winners and runner-ups in close auction sample. The point estimates and standard errors
are transformed to absolute employment increase based on the coefficients and the mean
number of employees (given in ’Mean employees’) at the beginning of the -6th fortnight.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
60



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-5 0.183 0.093 0.208 0.122 0.157
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
-4 0.390 0.278 0.259 0.278 0.238
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
-3 0.384 0.294 0.073 0.270 0.076
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
-2 0.678 0.551 0.320 0.426 0.477
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
-1 0.797 0.752 0.205 0.608 0.365
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
0 1.110∗∗ 1.175∗∗ 0.013 1.014∗ 0.131
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
1 1.495∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗ 0.036 1.341∗∗ 0.167
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
2 1.602∗∗∗ 1.562∗∗∗ 0.183 1.630∗∗∗ −0.135
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
3 2.008∗∗∗ 1.919∗∗∗ 0.682 2.058∗∗∗ 0.220
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
4 2.236∗∗∗ 2.193∗∗∗ 0.796 2.168∗∗∗ 0.569
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
5 2.450∗∗∗ 2.470∗∗∗ 0.603 2.066∗∗∗ 0.973
(0.551) (0.558) (0.872) (0.564) (0.837)
Won (dummy) −0.272 −0.655 0.571 −0.591 0.302
(0.395) (0.403) (0.622) (0.409) (0.597)
Log. of employees −20.258∗∗∗ −33.198∗∗∗ −40.340∗∗∗ −38.964∗∗∗ −30.700∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.784) (0.921) (0.664) (0.986)
Mean employees 124.2338 100.0533 137.7475 92.9547 145.9471
N 31.872 15.768 14.640 15.888 14.508
R2 0.394 0.508 0.395 0.518 0.349













Notes: The dependent variable is employment growth at firm-auction level in each fortnight
period (from -6 to 20). The model is estimated with the equation (2). The indepen-
dent variables are the fortnight periods, the ’Won (dummy)’ for auction winner, ’Log.
of employees’ is the natural log of the firms’ number of employees -6 fortnights before
the auction and firm specific fixed effects are included. The estimates are calculated
using the package (’lfe’, Gaure, 2013) and show the LATE, difference in employment
growth rates between winners and runner-ups in close auction sample. The point es-
timates and standard errors are transformed to absolute employment increase based
on the coefficients and the mean number of employees (given in ’Mean employees’)
at the beginning of the -6th fortnight
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-5 0.183 0.382 0.301 −0.145 −0.495 0.659
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
-4 0.390 0.438 0.693 0.116 −0.768 0.915
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
-3 0.384 0.063 1.102 −0.034 −0.513 0.397
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
-2 0.678 0.957 1.153 −0.186 −0.009 0.362
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
-1 0.797 1.805 1.044 −0.260 0.084 −0.067
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
0 1.110∗∗ 2.367∗ 1.654 −0.075 −0.390 −0.101
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
1 1.495∗∗∗ 2.623∗∗ 2.256∗∗ 0.035 −0.303 0.008
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
2 1.602∗∗∗ 3.051∗∗ 2.843∗∗∗ −0.622 −0.191 −0.162
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
3 2.008∗∗∗ 3.819∗∗∗ 3.640∗∗∗ −0.981 0.571 −0.019
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
4 2.236∗∗∗ 4.127∗∗∗ 3.621∗∗∗ −1.101 0.807 0.740
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
5 2.450∗∗∗ 3.856∗∗∗ 3.142∗∗∗ −0.322 0.768 1.346
(0.551) (1.313) (1.093) (0.932) (1.079) (1.231)
Won (dummy) −0.272 −1.227 −1.218 −0.077 0.040 0.391
(0.395) (0.955) (0.796) (0.668) (0.772) (0.879)
Log. of employees −20.258∗∗∗ −49.823∗∗∗ −61.618∗∗∗ −39.603∗∗∗ −36.372∗∗∗ −20.223∗∗∗
(0.451) (1.306) (2.430) (1.481) (1.406) (1.464)
Mean employees 124.2338 45.0804 127.7355 142.9283 113.1478 174.929
N 31.872 6.720 6.396 5.856 5.844 5.580
R2 0.394 0.486 0.594 0.427 0.404 0.359














Notes: We split the data into 5 similarly sized samples according to the bidders share of costs for agency
workers in the total labour costs.
The dependent variable is employment growth at firm-auction level in each fortnight period (from
-6 to 20). The model is estimated with the equation (2). The independent variables are the
fortnight periods, the ’Won (dummy)’ for auction winner, ’Log. of employees’ is the natural log of
the firms’ number of employees -6 fortnights before the auction and firm specific fixed effects are
included. The estimates are calculated using the package (’lfe’, Gaure, 2013) and show the LATE,
difference in employment growth rates between winners and runner-ups in close auction sample.
The point estimates and standard errors are transformed to absolute employment increase based on
the coefficients and the mean number of employees (given in ’Mean employees’) at the beginning of
the -6th fortnight.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.
62
Table A32: Characteristics of winners’ new employees: education level, sources of previous
employment and mean age
Education level Previous employment No. of new employees Mean employee age
Higher Educated
Different firm 240 38.56
No previous employment 538 32.89
Same firm 488 35.80
Total 1266 35.08
Lower Educated
Different firm 1332 38.49
No previous employment 3976 34.62
Same firm 4711 38.65
Total 10019 37.03
Any education level
Different firm 1572 38.50
No previous employment 4514 34.41
Same firm 5199 38.38
Total 11285 36.81
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Table A33: The sector where the winners’ unique new employees were previously employed:
subsample of employees coming from different firm
Sector of previous employment
No. of new
employees
F - Construction 1145
C - Manufacturing 146
G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 110
M - Professional, scientific and technical activities 55
N - Administrative and support service activities 40
H - Transportation and storage 27
E - Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 14
B - Mining and quarrying 10
L - Real estate activities 10
I - Accommodation and food service activities 4
D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 3
J - Information and communication 3
A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2
R - Arts, entertainment and recreation 2
S - Other service activities 1
Total 1572
Table A34: Professions of the winners new employees
NKD code Number of new employees
(7122) Masons 996
(7124) Carpenters & joiners 799
(9911) Workers without occupations 774
(9312) Civil engineering workers 638
(8332) Operators of construction-, and similar machinery 634
(8324) Drivers of heavy goods vehicles and towing vehicles 602
(3112) Architectural, civil and geodetic engineers and technicians 571
(7222) Toolmakers and related occupations 438
(7129) Other masonry occupations 389
(9132) Cleaners and maids 361





Auction awarded value Quantification of a single employee
Median Mean Obs. Employee effect Cost (by Median) Cost (by Mean)
Entire sample 178506.67 721422.24 2859.00 1.82 98080.59 396385.80
By bid ”closeness”
10% 206294.67 804698.65 1436.00 2.45 84201.90 328448.43
.5% to 4% 214906.13 641032.67 610.00 2.167 99172.19 295815.7
By agency expenses
2nd quantile 176805.47 782083.31 484.00 3.64 48572.93 214858.10
1st quantile 186612.00 537966.51 511.00 4.127 45217.35 130352.90
< 100,000e 62252.27 55558.84 201.00 0.85 72894.93 65057.19
100,000e–
500,000e




635793.07 682022.80 290.00 2.79 227801.17 244365.03
> 1,500,000e 1989373.97 5199027.43 158.00 7.36 270479.13 706869.81
Notes: All monetary values are given in euros. VAT is excluded.
